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Consider the following story: 
On November 22, 2004, Anthony R. Chase, CEO of ChaseCom, a call-
center provider for telecommunications companies, returned to give the 
Traphagen Distinguished Alumni Lecture at his alma mater, Harvard Law 
School. Chase’s lunchtime talk departed from the standard fare for such 
gatherings. Instead of reminiscing about how much he loved law school in the 
late 1970s and demurely cataloguing his professional success since graduation, 
Chase candidly told his young audience that he often didn’t have a clue what 
his legendary professors were talking about—that is, when he bothered to stop 
in to hear what they were saying—and that his path from affirmative action 
admittee to CEO of his own company with gross revenues in the tens of millions 
had been anything but straight and trouble-free. He had failed many times, he 
told them, but had always been able to pick himself up. It was at these moments 
that his Harvard degrees (he has three of them) had proved most useful, 
providing both contacts and credibility that allowed him to pursue his dreams 
anew. 
At the conclusion of the talk, the diverse group of students in attendance 
applauded wildly. As several confided in me afterwards, no one had ever talked 
to them like that before. Here was someone whose real struggles they could 
relate to—and whose honesty gave them the courage to admit that they had 
struggles of their own. A half dozen or so asked me for Chase’s email so that 
they could tell him how much the talk had meant to them. One of those who did 
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law and Director of the Program on the Legal 
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was a former student of mine from Taiwan. In addition to conveying her 
appreciation for Chase’s talk and her admiration for his outlook on life, the 
student also wanted to make a connection. Her brother and his college 
roommate from MIT had recently started a telecommunications company in 
Taiwan. She wondered whether his company and ChaseCom might be able to 
do business. Four emails later, the black CEO from Texas and the entrepreneur 
from Taiwan were in discussions about a possible business deal. 
Now ask yourself the following question: 
Would Anthony Chase have been better off if he had gone to Boston 
College Law School instead of to Harvard? 
If you buy the logic of Rick Sander’s apparently well-researched, well-
argued, and undoubtedly well-intentioned paper, the answer to this question 
would have to be yes. Notwithstanding a few qualifications along the way, even 
elite school graduates like Anthony Chase, and all of the other beneficiaries of 
affirmative action over the last forty years, would—on average—have been 
better off going to lower-ranked law schools where their entering credentials 
would have fit better with the entering credentials of their white peers. 
To be sure, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that this is Sander’s central 
claim. Many of the article’s hundred-plus pages, and the vast majority of his 
statistical analyses, are devoted to other arguments—for example, that contrary 
to the Supreme Court’s finding in Grutter,1 law schools actually operate a dual 
admissions system in which blacks are evaluated separately from whites, or that 
law schools form a connected “system” in which admissions decisions taken by 
schools higher up the prestige chain have predictable consequences for the 
admissions decisions of lower-ranked schools. As interesting as these claims 
may be, however, they are, by Sander’s own terms, peripheral to the “principal 
question of interest” his article is designed to address: to wit, “whether 
affirmative action in law schools generates benefits to blacks that substantially 
exceed the costs to blacks.”2 To put the point bluntly, even if law schools are 
operating a dual admissions system in violation of Bakke3 and Grutter, so long 
as that system generates “benefits to blacks that substantially exceed the costs 
to blacks,”4 it would pass the minimal but crucial test that Sander poses for its 
legitimacy. 
Similarly, it is easy to lose sight of the reason why Sander asserts that the 
costs to blacks of affirmative action outweigh the benefits. A good deal of 
Sander’s analysis is devoted to arguing that many black students receive low 
grades in law school. Once again, this is an interesting and important issue—
one that undoubtedly deserves the attention of those of us who spend our time 
1. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
2.R i c h a r d  H .  S a n d e r ,  A Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law 
Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 369 (2004) (emphasis added). 
3. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  
4. Sander, supra note 2, at 369.  WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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teaching in law schools. But for Sander’s overall argument, low grades are only 
important, as he concedes, if they produce “bad outcomes” such as “higher 
attrition rates, lower pass rates on the bar, [or] problems in the job market.”5 
After all, in the days before affirmative action, all of the bottom places on the 
law school grade ladder were occupied by whites.6 Once again, to put the 
matter bluntly, even if affirmative action systematically lowers the grades 
blacks receive in law school, if the beneficiaries of these policies go on to 
become successful and satisfied practitioners, then the costs to them of bad 
grades would be outweighed by the benefits that flow from a successful legal 
career. 
Thus, once we clear away all of the underbrush, Sander’s argument that 
affirmative action hurts blacks comes down to an assertion about the relative 
value of grades (and all that they represent) versus law school prestige (and all 
that it represents) in achieving the ultimate goal shared by all law students of 
becoming a lawyer and building a successful career.7 By Sander’s calculation, 
the primary effect of affirmative action is to allow black law students to attend 
schools that are twenty to fifty places above the schools that they would have 
been admitted to in the absence of these policies.8 Without more, this would 
seem to be a clear benefit to those who receive this boost, as Sander concedes 
virtually every law student, black and white, firmly believes. Consequently, in 
order to prove his point that blacks are nevertheless harmed by affirmative 
action, Sander must demonstrate that “the net trade-off of higher prestige but 
weaker academic performance substantially harms black performance on bar 
exams and harms most new black lawyers in the job market.”9 
Indeed, although Sander devotes significantly more attention to bar passage 
than employment success, it is this latter claim—that attending a more highly 
ranked school actually hurts “most new black lawyers in the job market”10—
that must in the end be the linchpin upon which his argument either succeeds or 
fails. Notwithstanding the grim statistics he amasses regarding black attrition 
and bar failure rates, the fact remains that most black students who begin law 
5. Id. at 370. 
6. I am grateful to Judge Harry Edwards for pointing out this obvious fact. As I argue 
below, this will also be the case if Sander’s proposal is adopted, at least with respect to the 
spots at the bottom of the class at highly ranked schools that will be vacated by blacks and 
(presumably) filled by whites. I consider the implications of this fact in Part IV. 
7. Even this statement must be qualified. As I indicate below, some number of students 
enter law school with no intention of ever practicing law. See infra pp. 129-130. 
Nevertheless, it is probably true that even those who do not intend to become lawyers when 
they graduate want to have the option of doing so that comes from graduating and passing 
the bar. 
8. Sander, supra note 2, at 478. 
9. Id. at 371-72. 
10. Id. at 372.  WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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school—fifty-seven percent—do in fact become lawyers.11 Moreover, a 
significant percentage of those who currently fail to graduate from law school 
and pass the bar would not become lawyers under Sander’s proposal either.12 
Although one can argue that black students who fall into this latter category 
would have been better off if they had never been admitted to law school in the 
first place (an assertion that I will return to below), if those blacks who do 
become lawyers benefit significantly from affirmative action, then it is hard to 
see why blacks as a group are worse off simply because a higher percentage of 
blacks fail the bar than whites.13 To make a persuasive claim that affirmative 
action harms “most” blacks, therefore, Sander must prove that grades are more 
important than law school prestige for those black law students who actually 
become lawyers. 
Finally it is important to recognize that to meet this crucial burden, Sander 
offers a single piece of evidence—and an equivocal piece at that. Sander argues 
that according to the first wave of responses to the After the JD Study 
(hereinafter “AJD Study”), black lawyers with high grades from low-status 
schools are as—if not more—likely to obtain high-paying jobs than their 
counterparts from higher-status schools with lower grades.14 On the basis of 
this single finding, Sander declares that contrary to popular belief, “[r]acial 
preferences . . . have not been an indispensable part of credentialing blacks for 
the job market; overall, they clearly end up shutting more doors than they 
open.”15 
11. The comparable number for whites is over eighty-three percent.  Timothy T. 
Clydesdale,  A Forked River Runs Through Law School: Toward Understanding Race, 
Gender, Age, and Related Gaps in Law School Performance and Bar Passage, 29 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 711, 727 (2004). 
12. Sander, supra note 2, at 474 (arguing that the 14% of black applicants who would 
not get into any law school under his plan have “such weak academic credentials that they 
add only a comparative handful of attorneys to total national production”). As I argue below, 
Sander’s statement understates the actual importance of those in this group. Nevertheless, it 
is true that 70% of those who Sander’s plan would exclude currently do not become lawyers. 
13. The fact that Sander claims that his proposal would increase the number of blacks 
who become lawyers in any given year does not change this conclusion. Although black law 
students who end up being among the 7.9% of new black lawyers Sander asserts his plan 
would produce should count as beneficiaries, if the remaining 92% of entering black 
lawyers—or even a percentage substantially greater than 7.9%—would actually be harmed 
by Sander’s proposal then it would be very difficult to conclude that “most” blacks would be 
helped by eliminating affirmative action. 
14. Sander,  supra note 2, at 454-68. In the interest of full disclosure, I should 
acknowledge that like Rick Sander, I am also one of the principal investigators on the AJD 
Study. For the purposes of this Response, I have neither replicated Sander’s analysis of the 
AJD Study data nor conducted my own independent review. Instead, I rely on Sander’s 
reporting of the data and on the information contained in the Report issued on our 
preliminary findings by the National Association of Law Placement Foundation and the 
American Bar Foundation in 2004. See RONIT DINOVITZER ET AL., AFTER THE J.D.: FIRST 
RESULTS OF A NATIONAL STUDY OF LEGAL CAREERS (2004) [hereinafter AJD STUDY]. 
15. Sander, supra note 2, at 479. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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In this brief Response, I will argue that this single piece of evidence does 
not come anywhere close to proving that most black lawyers would be better 
off in a world in which the vast majority of them would attend law schools 
twenty to fifty places below the ones that they currently attend, and where 
hundreds of blacks who currently attend law school today would be denied the 
opportunity to do so altogether. Affirmative action has played a crucial role in 
helping black lawyers to overcome the systematic and persistent obstacles that 
continue to make it more difficult for these new entrants to succeed 
notwithstanding the progress the country has made in reducing the overt 
discrimination that for the first two centuries of our history kept blacks out of 
virtually every desirable aspect of American society. Indeed, it is precisely 
because these policies have been so successful that for the first time blacks with 
high grades from lower-status schools have a plausible chance of gaining entry 
into high-paying positions in the legal profession. These tentative gains, 
however, are unlikely to continue if the number of black graduates from highly 
ranked schools were to decline dramatically. Although the picture is more 
complex with respect to those black students who are unlikely to end up in 
high-status jobs, they too have benefited more from affirmative action than 
Sander’s analysis suggests. Equally important, the problems those in this group 
undoubtedly confront have as much to do with the way that bar exams are 
conceived and administered as they do with these students’ potential to become 
competent practitioners. 
The rest of this Response proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly reminds us 
of the long and sorry history of exclusion that gave rise to the need for 
affirmative action in the first place and examines how this legacy continues to 
disadvantage black lawyers. Part II examines Sander’s contention that grades 
are more important than law school status in the context of black graduates 
from highly ranked schools. Contrary to Sander’s assertion, black lawyers in 
this group gain benefits from their prestigious degrees that extend far beyond 
the starting salaries that they receive upon graduation. In turn, these fledgling 
members of the profession’s elite provide important benefits to all black 
lawyers—and to society as a whole. Part III examines those black lawyers who 
appear to have benefited the least from affirmative action: those who attend 
lower-tier local and regional law schools. Although Sander makes a persuasive 
claim that these students face daunting risks in pursuing a career in law, a 
significant number plausibly benefit from their legal education, even if they do 
not go on to become lawyers. Moreover, given that bar passage is the most 
important obstacle facing blacks in this group, we can gain as many new black 
lawyers by reforming the way that such exams are administered and taken as 
Sander claims we will produce by eliminating the black students who currently 
have the most trouble passing. Part IV briefly concludes by arguing that, rather 
than improving conditions for black lawyers, Sander’s proposal runs the risk of 
making many of the problems he identifies worse. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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Before proceeding I want to make one thing clear. Rejecting Sander’s 
bottom line does not mean that we also should reject his invitation to take a 
hard look at the costs and benefits of our current practices. Sander amasses 
many troubling statistics about how some black students are performing in law 
school and on the bar. It is imperative that we face up to these difficult realities. 
But when we examine these issues, we must also recognize that the “system” of 
affirmative action in place today is a response to a set of policies and practices 
that have—and continue to—systematically disadvantage black lawyers. It is 
only by placing affirmative action in the broader context of how careers are 
actually forged in today’s legal marketplace that we can reach credible 
judgments about whether such policies hurt some of their intended 
beneficiaries, and, more importantly, what we might do to rectify this situation. 
I. THE NOT-SO-GOLDEN AGE 
In Part I of his article, Sander gives a quick nod to the historical conditions 
that prompted, to borrow his phrase, “the conscience of the legal academy to 
quiver,” precipitating programs that for the first time affirmatively recruited 
black students to law school. This history, however, is more relevant to 
Sander’s argument than his brief presentation suggests. 
As Sander concedes, prior to the mid-1960s there were only a handful of 
black lawyers in the entire country.16 What he fails to acknowledge is that this 
underrepresentation was the result of a deliberate and concerted effort by the 
profession’s elite in both the North and the South to restrict entry to white, 
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant men of means.17 Blacks—regardless of their 
qualifications—were overtly discriminated against by educators and employers 
alike.18 The few blacks who managed to become lawyers during this period 
16. In 1960, there were approximately 2000 black lawyers in the United States, 
constituting just over one percent of the profession. See  RICHARD  L.  ABEL,  AMERICAN 
LAWYERS 100 (1989); Harry T. Edwards, A New Role for the Black Law Graduate—A 
Reality or an Illusion?, 69 MICH. L. REV. 1407, 1410 (1971) (reporting the number of black 
lawyers in 1960 as 2180). This meager number was only marginally higher than the 1300 
black lawyers practicing when Thurgood Marshall joined the bar in 1930. 
17. For excellent accounts of the legal profession’s history of discrimination and 
exclusion, see ABEL, supra note 16; JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND 
SOCIAL  CHANGE IN MODERN  AMERICA (1976); J.  CLAY  SMITH,  JR.,  EMANCIPATION:  THE 
MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYER, 1844-1944 (1993). 
18. Just to hit a few of the highlights: no black received a legal education prior to the 
Civil War; the ABA did not admit black members until 1943; and in 1947, William Coleman 
could not get a job in his native Philadelphia notwithstanding graduating number one in his 
class at Harvard Law School, being an editor on the Harvard Law Review, and clerking for 
Justice Felix Frankfurter. See, e.g., RICHARD  KLUGER,  SIMPLE  JUSTICE 292-93 (1977) 
(describing Coleman’s experience); SMITH, supra note 17, at 541-45 (noting that the ABA 
did not admit blacks until 1943); J. Clay Smith, Jr., In Freedom’s Birthplace: The Making of 
George Lewis Ruffin, the First Black Law Graduate of Harvard University, 39 HOWARD L.J. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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worked in solo practice or small minority firms, barely eking out a living 
serving an almost exclusively minority clientele.19 As late as 1964, Erwin 
Smigel reported in his study of Wall Street lawyers that “in the year and a half 
that was spent interviewing, I heard of only three Negroes who had been hired 
by large law firms. Two of these were women who did not meet the client.”20 
Nor were blacks the only ones excluded. During the 1920s, leading lawyers 
sought to prevent a “pestiferous horde” of recent immigrants from entering the 
profession by closing night and part-time law schools and escalating 
admissions requirements—including requiring every applicant to pass a written 
examination and a character and fitness review before becoming a member of 
the bar.21 Until the 1950s, many law schools maintained quotas limiting the 
number of Jews that they would admit. Even after the academy dropped their 
quotas, many law firms would not hire Jews—or anyone but the “right kind of 
Jews”—until well into the 1960s.22 Overt and unabashed discrimination against 
women lasted even longer, with many firms refusing to hire or promote more 
than a token number of women well into the 1970s.23 Given this history, it is 
no wonder that in 1961, President Kennedy’s secretary of labor called the 
American legal profession “the worst segregated group in the whole 
economy.”24 
It is important to understand that these policies and practices expressed 
more than simple discriminatory animus. Instead, they reflected deep and 
widespread beliefs about the very essence of lawyer professionalism. 
Competence and identity were inextricably intertwined in the minds of lawyers 
in what some like to refer to as the profession’s “golden age.”25 Nowhere was 
201, 214-16 (1995) (reporting that Ruffin was the first black graduate of an American law 
school, in 1869). 
19.S e e  G ERALDINE R. SEGAL, BLACKS IN THE LAW: PHILADELPHIA AND THE NATION 
218 (1983). 
20.E RWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER 45 (2d ed. 1969). 
21.A UERBACH, supra note 17, at 121. The phrase comes from George Wickersham, a 
former U.S. attorney general and the founder of the Wall Street law firm of Cadwalader, 
Wickersham & Taft that continues to bear his name. See also MARCIA GRAHAM SYNNOTT, 
THE  HALF-OPENED  DOOR:  DISCRIMINATION AND ADMISSIONS AT HARVARD,  YALE, AND 
PRINCETON, 1900-1970, at 18 (1979) (quoting a dean at Columbia as boasting that the use of 
standardized tests had allowed the school to cut the number of Jews it admitted by half). 
22. See Note, The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs—Discriminatory Effects in 
Law Firm Hiring Practices, 73 YALE L.J. 625 (1964). 
23.S e e  CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (1993). 
24.S EGAL, supra note 19, at 24 (footnotes omitted) (paraphrasing Secretary of Labor 
Willard Wirtz). 
25.S e e  M ARC  GALANTER  &  THOMAS  PALAY,  TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS:  THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 20-36 (1991) (referring to the “Golden Age” of the 
large law firm “circa 1960”). In subsequent work, Galanter makes clear that unlike some 
who celebrate this period as a halcyon time, any realistic appraisal of the profession’s past 
must account for the many not-so-golden exclusionary practices that were the hallmark of 
the era. See Marc Galanter, Lawyers in the Mist: The Golden Age of Legal Nostalgia, 100 WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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this ideology more prevalent than in the profession’s elite. As Smigel observed, 
“[Wall Street firms] want lawyers who are Nordic, have pleasing personalities 
and ‘clean-cut’ appearances, are graduates of the ‘right’ schools, have the 
‘right’ social background and experience in the affairs of the world, and are 
endowed with tremendous stamina.”26 Even after a lawyer was hired, firms 
considered the associate’s ability to fit into the firm’s tightly knit social 
structure to be almost as important as the number of hours he worked or his 
potential for bringing in business when deciding whether he should be elevated 
to partnership.27 
This is the background against which law schools finally instituted policies 
designed to ensure that more than a paltry number of blacks and other 
traditional outsiders had access to legal education.28 As Sander suggests, these 
programs were typically justified on the ground that black students needed 
“preferential treatment” in order to gain admission to law school and therefore 
to increase the size of the black bar.29 The above history, however, suggests a 
deeper and more powerful justification. Law schools and legal employers were 
justified in taking affirmative steps to assist black students and lawyers in order 
to counteract the systematic and pervasive preferences that had been accorded 
to white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant men of means for more than one hundred 
years.30 
DICK. L. REV. 549 (1996) (reviewing MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 
(1994)). 
26.S MIGEL, supra note 20, at 37. 
27. See id. at 106. As one partner observed: 
There are intangibles. We see a man for long hours over the years, see his wife, know his 
family background, what outside charity activities he participates in. You get to know these 
people over a ten year period. You see them in your home or when you’re away on a trip 
with them—the word comes down about them from judges and clients. We encourage extra- 
curricular activities. On a personal level, if we never see a man at functions we wonder if he 
has the qualities we want—if he measures up. He must be able to play team ball—if he can’t 
we will not take him, for we are also looking for personal qualities, including his ability to go 
along with you. 
Id. 
28. It bears repeating that blacks are by no means the only, or arguably even the 
largest, beneficiaries of affirmative action in the last forty years. Since the 1960s, Hispanics, 
Asians, Native Americans, and white women were all considered part of the effort to reverse 
the exclusionary history described above. Like Sander, however, for present purposes I 
confine my analysis to the experience of black law students and lawyers. 
29. Sander, supra note 2, at 377-80. 
30. I recognize that the Supreme Court rejected this justification for affirmative action 
in Bakke. As I indicated above, however, notwithstanding his long discussion about Grutter, 
Sander is not making an argument about constitutional law. Indeed, Sander is quite clear that 
he rejects the primary argument advanced by opponents of affirmative action in Bakke that 
such policies are unconstitutional because they harm the interests of whites. To the contrary, 
Sander argues that whites are actually benefited by affirmative action because they are 
protected from harder grading and lower bar passage rates. I return to these arguments 
below. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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Judged against this historical background, the last forty years have 
produced remarkable progress. There are now approximately 40,000 black 
lawyers in the United States—an increase of almost twentyfold since 1960.31 
Black lawyers can now be found in virtually every sector of the profession and 
in many of the high-end jobs in corporations, government, and the judiciary for 
which elite jobs in the legal profession typically serve as a gateway.32 
Moreover, every study examining the careers of this new generation of black 
professionals has concluded that these beneficiaries of affirmative action have 
gone on to lead successful and productive careers—careers that from all 
accounts are equal to, and in some respects even exceed, those of their initially 
better-credentialed white peers.33 Given that this progress coincides exactly 
with the period in which law schools have been pursuing affirmative action 
programs expressly designed to bring about this result, anyone claiming that 
such policies have been counterproductive (the strong form of Sander’s claim) 
or are no longer necessary (the weak form) appropriately bears a very heavy 
burden of persuasion.34 
31. See  U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special EEO Tabulation, at 
http://www.census.gov/eeo2000/index.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2005) (reporting that there 
were 33,865 black, non-Hispanic lawyers in 2000). Given that Sander projects that 
approximately two thousand new black lawyers enter the bar every year, the current size of 
the black bar is undoubtedly closer to forty thousand. Sander, supra note 2, at 473. 
32.S e e   generally David B. Wilkins, From “Separate Is Inherently Unequal” to 
“Diversity Is Good for Business”: The Rise of Market-Based Diversity Arguments and the 
Fate of the Black Corporate Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004). 
33. As Sander acknowledges, the two such studies that are most important are 
WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES 
OF  CONSIDERING  RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY  ADMISSIONS (1998), and David L. 
Chambers et al., Michigan’s Minority Graduates in Practice: The River Runs Through Law 
School, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 395 (2000). In 2000, I conducted a comprehensive survey 
of all living black Harvard Law School graduates (n = 657) which also concluded that these 
graduates were quite successful in their careers. DAVID B. WILKINS ET AL., HARVARD LAW 
SCHOOL: REPORT ON THE STATE OF BLACK ALUMNI, 1869-2000 (2002). To be sure, each of 
these studies has weaknesses. I return to some of these below. See infra note 40. 
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that there has never been any comprehensive investigation of 
the careers of the black recipients of affirmative action that has reached a contrary 
conclusion. Research about the long-term effects of affirmative action in other fields is 
consistent with this conclusion. See Harry Holzer & David Neumark, Assessing Affirmative 
Action, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 483, 559 (2000) (finding on the basis of a thorough review 
of available studies that there is “very little compelling evidence of deleterious efficiency 
effects of affirmative action” and that “the empirical case against affirmative action on the 
grounds of efficiency is weak at best”). 
34. Sander is ambiguous about whether he is claiming that affirmative action has 
always harmed black law students (or harmed them since the “second phase” of these 
programs after Bakke) or that, whatever value these programs had in the past, such efforts 
are now unnecessary or counterproductive. Given his criticism of law school admissions in 
the years since Bakke and his extensive reliance on the Bar Passage Study, which chronicles 
a class of law students who have now been in practice for more than a decade, it seems fair 
to charge him with the stronger claim that affirmative action has been harmful to black 
lawyers for some time. In order to remove any ambiguity on my part, however, I have tried WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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At the same time, there is ample evidence that the profession’s long history 
of exclusion continues to affect black lawyers adversely even if we concede, as 
the evidence also indicates, that overt discrimination against blacks has 
decreased markedly over the last three decades. I have written extensively 
about the racialized disadvantages that blacks continue to face in the legal 
marketplace, especially with respect to elite jobs.35 For present purposes, it is 
sufficient to simply say this: Notwithstanding the important progress 
documented above, a mounting array of evidence confirms that most whites 
continue to hold a broad range of negative stereotypes about blacks even as 
they consciously profess to believe in racial equality.36 At the same time, an 
equally long line of research confirms what any observer of human nature takes 
for granted: that people instinctively prefer to work with others who are like 
themselves.37 The combination of these common and widespread prejudices 
can be deadly for blacks seeking to make it in the corporate law firm world. 
Law is fundamentally a relationship business. At every stage, decisionmakers 
are asked to make important choices on the basis of limited and imperfect 
information. Law firms continue to give substantial weight to issues of 
“comfort” and “fit” when making hiring decisions. Partners choose which 
to be clear throughout whether I am addressing the strong or the weak form of Sander’s 
argument. 
35. See, e.g.,  David B. Wilkins, Doing Well by Doing Good? The Role of Public 
Service in the Careers of Black Corporate Lawyers, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1 (2004); Wilkins, 
supra note 32; David B. Wilkins, Partners Without Power?: A Preliminary Look at Black 
Partners in Corporate Law Firms, 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 15 (1999); David B. 
Wilkins, Rollin’ on the River: Race, Elite Schools, and the Equality Paradox, 25 LAW & 
SOC. INQUIRY 527 (2000); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Why Are There So Few Black 
Lawyers in Corporate Law Firms?: An Institutional Analysis, 84 CAL. L. REV. 493 (1996); 
David B. Wilkins, Book Review, On Being Good and Black, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1924 (1999) 
[hereinafter Wilkins, Book Review] (reviewing PAUL M. BARRETT, THE GOOD BLACK: A 
TRUE STORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (1999)). The arguments presented in these articles are 
expanded and illuminated by material from over two hundred in-depth interviews with black 
lawyers in my forthcoming book, The Black Bar: The Legacy of Brown v. Board of 
Education and the History of Race and the American Legal Profession (forthcoming 2005). 
The citations to interviews below come from that project. In order to preserve 
confidentiality, respondents are identified only by number and the date of the interview. 
36. See John F. Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled 
Processes, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 517 (1997); Russell H. Fazio et al., 
Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes: A Bona 
Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1013, 1022 (1995); see also Mahzarin 
R. Banaji, The Opposite of a Great Truth Is Also True: Homage to Koan #7,  in 
PERSPECTIVISM IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE YIN AND YANG OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 127 
(John T. Jost et al. eds., 2003); Nilanjana Dasgupta et al., Automatic Preference for White 
Americans: Eliminating the Familiarity Explanation, 36 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 
316, 324-25 (2000); William von Hippel et al., The Linguistic Intergroup Bias as an Implicit 
Indicator of Prejudice, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 490, 507 (1997). 
37. See, e.g., David A. Thomas, Racial Dynamics in Cross-Race Developmental 
Relationships, 38 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 169 (1993); see also John F. Dovidio, On the Nature of 
Contemporary Prejudice: The Third Wave, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 829, 844-45 (2001). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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associates to train and to select for plum assignments on the basis of first 
impressions, secondhand information, and generalized reputation. Clients 
employ similarly impressionistic information when selecting lawyers and law 
firms for important assignments. 
None of this should be taken to mean, as Sander rightly insists, that factors 
such as “cognitive skill and subject mastery” play no role in career success.38 
They clearly do. This point sometimes gets lost in all of the talk about the “old 
boy network” or “white privilege.” Where Sander errs is in assuming that law 
school grades accurately map these important qualities. Grades certainly 
measure something about certain kinds of analytic ability and whether a student 
has understood and can replicate what the professor believes that he or she was 
intending to teach. And Sander is also correct in assuming that grades measure 
these qualities more accurately at the two tails of the distribution (i.e., for those 
at the top and the bottom of the class) than they do for the majority of students 
who fall in the middle of the curve. 
Nevertheless, grades still remain a very imperfect proxy. It is not simply 
that grades do not purport to measure, as Sander concedes, how “conscientious, 
well-spoken, diligent, likeable, or ethical” someone is, although these factors 
are clearly an important part of what makes someone a good lawyer.39 They 
also do not do a particularly good job of measuring creativity, the ability to 
work well in and manage teams, the ability to listen to  and to empathize with 
others, and, most important of all, that critical but elusive quality that lawyers 
refer to as “good judgment.” Indeed, there are good reasons to believe that the 
typical way that grades are administered and evaluated in law school may select 
against traits like teamwork and creativity. And teamwork and creativity—let 
alone good judgment—are at least as big a part of being a “good problem-
solver,” to borrow Sander’s phrase for what clients value in a lawyer, as 
cognitive ability and substantive skill  in a profession like law where success 
frequently depends upon the ability to “play well with others” and to persuade 
them to do what you and your client want. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
studies that attempt to understand the causes of long-term career success have 
not documented a robust correlation between grades and other entry-level 
credentials and long-term career success.40 
38. Sander, supra note 2, at 456. 
39. Id. 
40. See, e.g., Chambers et al., supra note 33, at 501 (finding no correlation between 
undergraduate grades and future income and only a modest relationship—explaining 
approximately 5% of the variation—between law school grades and future income); James 
B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, Efficiency Wages and Employment Rents: The Employer-
Size Wage Effect in the Job Market for Lawyers, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 678, 690 (1995) (reporting 
that in their analysis of partner income, variables corresponding to law school prestige, law 
review membership, and top law school grades “are not statistically significant at the 5% 
level”). Neither of these comparisons proves that law school grades or other standard entry-
level credentials have no effect on future earnings, let alone on the more general issue of 
career success. To name only the most obvious limitation, both studies suffer from classic WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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It is precisely because qualities such as creativity, skill, and judgment are 
both difficult to observe directly and complex to measure that decisionmakers 
frequently rely on proxies—such as whether someone “has the right 
background,” “exudes confidence,” or “makes me feel at ease”—when 
deciding whom to trust among the broad range of arguably qualified applicants. 
In a world in which most whites continue to hold negative stereotypes about 
black intellectual inferiority, these common heuristics systematically 
disadvantage the career prospects of black lawyers.41 
To be sure, a growing number of black lawyers have found ways to 
circumvent these obstacles. And, as the AJD Study data Sander relies on 
suggests (although, as I will argue below, falls far short of proving), employers 
of all kinds may be more receptive to hiring black lawyers than they have ever 
been in the past. These new realities, however, owe much more to the past 
success and current practice of affirmative action than Sander suggests. To see 
why, it is necessary to take a closer look at the crucial role that black graduates 
from elite schools have played in opening the doors of opportunity for all black 
lawyers. 
“restricted range” problems. The Michigan study is only relevant to the career success of 
Michigan graduates. Given the credentials of most law firm partners, the Rebitzer and Taylor 
study is also only measuring a relatively narrow range of potential entering credentials. 
Indeed, given the description of how elite employers hire and retain lawyers contained in the 
next Part, it would be quite surprising if there were no correlation between these traditional 
entering credentials and career success. My point simply is that whatever relationship exists 
is likely to be much more attenuated—and much less independently grounded (since the 
value of grades and law school status reside as much in the fact that they are easily visible 
and rankable signals that reinforce the self-perceptions of those applying them)—than 
Sander’s easy equation of grades with “cognitive skill and subject mastery” would lead one 
to believe. Sander, supra note 2, at 456. At a minimum, neither study—nor any other of 
which I am aware—has ever established the kind of robust relationship between grades and 
career success that would justify the power that these traditional credentials are often 
assumed to have. See also Lani Guinier, Lessons and Challenges of Becoming Gentlemen, 24 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 12 n.37 (1998) (reporting on a study done by a prominent 
law firm that found, with the exception of those at the very top, that there was little 
correlation between grades and quality with respect to the lawyers in the firm); Luariz Vold, 
Legal Preparation Tested by Success in Practice, 33 HARV. L. REV. 168, 174-75 (1919) 
(study of all those admitted to the North Dakota bar between 1902 and 1913, comparing 
success in court to law school grades, and finding that the highest-ranked students 
academically were less successful in court than the next lower tier of students). Research in 
other fields is consistent with this conclusion. See Holzer & Neumark, supra note 33, at 544 
(noting that while “[t]here is some evidence of lower qualifications for minorities hired 
under affirmative action programs,” “[e]vidence of lower performance among these 
minorities appears much less consistently or convincingly”). 
41. Once again, research on the continuing existence of discrimination in labor markets 
generally is consistent with this conclusion. See Holzer & Neumark, supra note 33, at 499 
(“Taken together, the various studies summarized above suggest that, while differences in 
educational attainment and cognitive skills account for large fractions of racial differences in 
wages, employer discrimination continues to play a role in generating different labor market 
outcomes by race and sex.”). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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II. MAKING ELITE BLACK LAWYERS 
Sander is willing to concede that black lawyers like Anthony Chase who 
graduate from Harvard and other schools at the very top of the law school 
hierarchy may in the end benefit from affirmative action.42 Even with respect to 
this most favored group, Sander’s concession is grudging at best. Sander does 
not dispute that black graduates from top schools, like their white counterparts, 
almost never fail to complete law school or eventually pass the bar.43 Sander 
also concedes that elite school graduates earn substantial wage premiums which 
can reach as high as forty percent.44 Nevertheless, Sander asserts that even for 
black graduates from the best schools, this wage premium is at best “a wash” or 
a “small plus” when weighed against the increased risk that blacks who attend 
these institutions will receive low grades.45 For all other black students, the 
trade-off between school status and grades is at best a substantial penalty for 
those blacks in highly ranked schools outside the top ten, and at worst leads to 
an “overwhelmingly negative” reduction in income for those graduating from 
middle- to lower-ranked schools.46 
Grudging though it may be, Sander’s concession that blacks from the very 
top schools are likely to benefit from their prestigious degrees is more 
important than he acknowledges. After all, even under Sander’s modified 
proposal in which the top schools would arbitrarily cap their black enrollent at 
42. Sander, supra note 2, at 373 (“[B]lack graduates at Harvard and Yale have their 
pick of jobs.”). 
43. Sander’s concession with respect to graduation rates for blacks at top schools is 
clear.  See id. at 437 (noting that over 95% of blacks attending the most elite schools 
graduate); see also UCLA Law Professor Proposes to Bump Black Law Students Down into 
Less Selective Law Schools, J.  BLACKS  HIGHER  EDUC.,  Autumn 2004, 
http://www.jbhe.com/news_views/45_sander_lawschool.html (reporting, in a survey of 
twenty-six highly ranked law schools, that black graduation rates average better than 90%—
including at nine schools such as Columbia, Georgetown, and the University of Michigan, 
which report three-year graduation rates of 100%—and that the rates at top schools like 
Harvard, Stanford, and Yale are all above 90%). As former Stanford dean Kathleen Sullivan 
notes in the Journal of Blacks in Higher Education article, when black students do not finish 
in three years, it is often due to a family emergency or other temporary situation, and the 
student eventually returns to school to complete his or her degree. Id. (quoting Sullivan as 
concluding “[o]ur record is, in fact, pretty much perfect”). It is important to note that these 
graduation rates appear higher than those in the Bar Passage Study. This is another 
indication, as Sander concedes, that black performance has improved since 1991. Sander is 
more equivocal with respect to bar passage rates among this group. Thus, he concedes that 
controlling for all other variables, students at more highly ranked schools have higher bar 
passage rates. Cf. Sander, supra note 2, at 449. He also asserts, however, that blacks who 
attend more highly ranked schools than their entering credentials warrant will have lower 
passage rates as a result of getting low grades. He never tests this proposition directly, 
however, with respect to black graduates of top schools nor reports black passage rates by 
school tier.  
44. Sander, supra note 2, at 465. 
45. Id. at 466. 
46. Id. at 465-66. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
114  DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION [Vol.  XX:nnn 
 
fifty perscent of current levels, half of all of the blacks who now attend top ten 
schools would be bumped down to schools where they would, by his own 
admission, not enjoy the benefits that they currently receive. By his estimation 
this might be as many as 150 people.47 If affirmative action were eliminated 
altogether, the number of blacks who would be harmed would be nearly twice 
as large, since, as Sander concedes, in the absence of such programs there 
would be few if any black students in the top law schools. In a proposal that 
claims to value blacks “as individuals,”48 this cost to blacks who currently 
benefit from the system should not be overlooked. 
Moreover, given that the population of black law students is 
disproportionately concentrated in schools at the top of the law school 
hierarchy, the actual number of blacks in danger of being hurt by the 
elimination of affirmative action under Sander’s own calculations is actually 
much larger. Thus, in the entering class of 1991 used by the Bar Passage Study, 
there were 419 black students enrolled in the top thirty law schools.49 By 
contrast, if one excludes blacks enrolled in the seven historically black 
institutions, which Sander concedes are properly viewed as a special case,50 
there were 1023 blacks enrolled in the remaining 123 schools that participated 
in the study. Put somewhat differently, the top twenty percent of all law schools 
account for over one-third of black enrollment in nonhistorically black 
institutions. If we use Sander’s top three categories of schools, which cover the 
forty most highly ranked institutions, the percentage of all black students who 
attend schools ranked in the top quarter of all law schools is likely to be even 
greater.51 
By Sander’s own calculations, eliminating affirmative action runs the risk 
of damaging the job market prospects of all of these black students. In Table 
47. Id. at 483. This number is almost equal to the number of black students who 
enrolled in such institutions in 1991. See id. at 415 tbl.3.1 (showing 147 blacks in top ten 
schools). Since the number of blacks attending law school has not doubled during this 
period, this suggests that the concentration of black students in top schools may be even 
greater today than it was in 1991. 
48. Id. at 454. 
49. I arrive at this number by adding the blacks in the top ten schools in Table 3.1 
(147), id. at 415 tbl.3.1, to the number in other “national” schools (272) in Table 5.3, id. at 
431 tbl.5.3. 
50. See id. at 416 (noting that the “seven law schools that have historically served 
minorities” are “obviously a special case”). As many have observed, many black students 
choose to attend historically black colleges and law schools even though they could attend 
more highly ranked schools. See generally JULIAN B. ROEBUCK & KOMANDURI S. MURTY, 
HISTORICALLY  BLACK  COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES:  THEIR  PLACE IN AMERICAN  HIGHER 
EDUCATION (1993). 
51. Sander, supra note 2, at 461 n.261 (defining law school categories). If we take as a 
rough guesstimate that there are an additional 100 black students in the schools ranked 
thirtieth through fortieth, somewhat fewer than the thirteen blacks per school in the top 
thirty, the black enrollment in the top forty schools would be 519, or roughly 36% of total 
black enrollment in just over 26% of law schools, excluding those that are historically black. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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7.4, Sander estimates that law school status is highly significant in terms of its 
effect on starting salaries for schools in his top three tiers.52 Although he 
predicts that the black students who currently enjoy this benefit would gain as 
much or more if they attended lower-ranked schools but received grades that 
were two standard deviations better than they are currently receiving, this is 
only a guess that depends upon many unknown factors. For example, if a black 
student currently admitted to a Tier 2 school ends up attending a school in Tier 
5 (as opposed to the Tier 4 school Sander predicts), the projected benefit 
associated with receiving better grades would likely be negated by the status 
penalty associated with attending a significantly less prestigious school.53 
Similarly, even if most blacks fall only the twenty to fifty places Sander 
predicts, if those who do only improve their grades by one standard deviation 
instead of the two Sander posits, they would, once again by Sander’s own 
calculation, be worse off under the new regime.54 For the moment, however, I 
52. Id. at 464 tbl.7.4. Although the p-value of school status for Tier 3 schools (.006) is 
substantially  greater than it is for the first two (< .0001 for Tier 1 and .0002 for Tier 2), as 
Sander acknowledges earlier, anything below .05 is typically considered highly significant. 
See id. at 438 n.190. 
53. The fact that elite schools have always led with respect to issues of race increases 
the risk that black students will fall farther than Sander predicts. If schools at the top are 
perceived as reducing their commitment to affirmative action, and to diversity more 
generally, it is quite possible that those in the lower tiers will do so as well. Today, having a 
reasonably diverse student body is generally considered a positive credential in assessing 
school status. If the top schools were to lose half or more of their black students, the 
relationship between diversity and eliteness might drift back to where it was in the days 
before affirmative action, particularly among schools that like to think of themselves as 
being more elite than they are in fact. In such a world, even though blacks who are currently 
attending Tier 2 schools may be eligible to be admitted to schools in Tier 4, they may not in 
fact be admitted since all law schools, as Sander makes clear, have many more qualified 
applicants than they have places to offer them. Given the substantial earning differences 
between Tiers, black students from Tier 2 schools who fall to Tier 5 schools (or students 
who fall from Tier 1 to Tier 4) will not receive the benefits Sander posits. 
54. Indeed, even if blacks improve their grades by as much as Sander predicts, so long 
as those grades remain average, they are unlikely to produce the payoff Sander suggests. 
Sander assumes that there is a continuous trade-off between grades and income. Sander, 
supra note 2, at 465 (“[O]ne standard-deviation improvement at a school produces, on 
average, a 12.3% rise in earnings.”). This is not, however, how law firms tend to think about 
grades. Rather than operating on the basis of a continuous curve, most law firms employ a 
set of grade cutoffs that are expressly tied to school status to guide their hiring decisions. By 
all accounts, these cutoffs rise sharply once one moves outside of the top schools. While 
students at top schools will be considered—although they may not be hired—if their grades 
are anywhere near the respectable range, those from lower-tier schools must be at the top of 
their class. Moreover, these cutoffs are also more rigidly enforced at lower-tier schools, since 
schools in this range routinely allow firms to prescreen resumes in order to ensure that 
applicants in fact meet their hiring criteria. In our survey of third-year law students, Mitu 
Gulati and I found that the students at both high- and low-status schools are well aware of 
the implications of these practices. See David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, What Law 
Students Think They Know About Elite Law Firms: Preliminary Results of a Survey of Third 
Year Law Students, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 1213, 1232-34 (2001) [hereinafter Wilkins & Gulati, 
Third Year Law Students] (reporting that elite school respondents believed that law firms WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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simply want to emphasize that Sander’s assumptions about the gains blacks 
will receive by getting better grades are just that—assumptions. Weighed 
against these assumptions is the very real wage premium that hundreds of black 
law students currently enjoy as a result of being able to attend schools in the 
top quarter of the law school hierarchy. 
Thus, even on the very narrow terms Sander proposes for valuing the 
benefits of law school prestige—salaries earned two years after graduation—it 
is far from clear that a proposal that jeopardizes more than one-third of all 
black law students who do not attend historically black institutions can be 
justified as being in the best interest of blacks as a group. At a minimum, this 
cost must be weighed against the benefits that Sander asserts blacks who attend 
schools outside of the top forty would receive under his proposal. I return to 
this question in Part III. To get an accurate sense of the trade-off Sander is 
proposing, however, it is crucial to recognize that the benefits of attending a 
highly ranked law school extend far beyond the initial boost in starting salary 
discussed above. 
Sander’s analysis suggests that top schools confer two important benefits 
on their students: an educational benefit, which he assumes blacks are not 
receiving because they tend to get low grades,55 and a placement benefit, which 
value law school prestige significantly more than grades, whereas those at less elite schools 
came to the opposite conclusion and believed that they needed significantly better academic 
credentials to be hired by a large law firm). Thus, even if a black student who is currently 
near the bottom of her class at Vanderbilt would finish in the middle of her class at the 
University of Tennessee, to borrow one of Sander’s examples, it is far from clear that she 
would make the grade cutoff employed by the smaller number of top firms that interview at 
the latter campus. I return below to Sander’s implicit claim that affirmative action in hiring 
will change this dynamic. 
55. There are good reasons to suspect that Sander underestimates even this benefit. 
Although getting a low grade is certainly an indication that one did not learn all that one 
could have in a given class, it does not mean that no learning took place at all. Given that top 
schools are likely to have significantly greater resources to teach a broader range of subjects 
than their less elite competitors—and to teach common subjects in a more advanced and 
sophisticated manner—even a student who is performing poorly may nevertheless be 
acquiring valuable knowledge in the classroom that he or she might not get at a lower-ranked 
school. Indeed, the very study Sander cites to support his claim that blacks do better at less 
elite schools also finds that schools with greater resources increase long-term earnings: 
We do find that students who attend colleges with higher average tuition costs tend to earn 
higher income years later, after adjusting for student characteristics . . . . Because tuition and 
expenditures per student are positively correlated, these results suggest that tuition matters 
because higher cost schools devote more resources to student instruction. 
Stacy Berg Dale & Alan B. Krueger, Estimating the Payoff to Attending a More Selective 
College: An Application of Selection on Observables and Unobservables, 117 Q.J. ECON. 
1491, 1524 (2002), cited in Sander, supra note 2, at 453 n.242. Significantly, Dale and 
Krueger find that these benefits are especially important for students from low-income 
backgrounds. See  id. at 1525 (finding “that the returns to school characteristics such as 
average SAT score or tuition are greatest for students from more disadvantaged 
backgrounds”). As I indicate below, many black students fall into this category. The 
evidence Sander relies on from Linda Loury and David Garman, see Linda Datcher Loury & 
David Garman, College Selectivity and Earnings, 13 J. LAB. ECON. 289 (1995), cited in WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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he concedes at least some do receive in the form of higher starting salaries. 
Educational and placement benefits are undoubtedly a large part of why 
students of all races, creeds, and colors fight so hard to get into top schools. As 
important as these benefits are, however, they fail to capture anything 
approaching the full value of attending an elite law school. In addition to 
acquiring substantive knowledge and gaining preferential initial access to the 
employment market, students attending elite schools are also socialized into the 
habits and possibilities of eliteness and granted a lifetime membership in the 
elite networks to which the graduates of such institutions automatically belong. 
Just as important, elite school graduates also obtain a visible and durable 
credential that they can use to signal to employers that they have received all of 
the valuable goods that elite schools provide—and that employers can use to 
signal their own competence and connections to clients and potential recruits. 
Over time, the socialization, networking, and credentialing benefits of a degree 
from an elite law school dominate the educational and placement advantages 
discussed by Sander. This is particularly true for black lawyers. 
The first of these benefits is nicely captured by Robert Granfield’s 
excellent book about Harvard Law School, entitled Making Elite Lawyers.56 
Granfield argues that more than learning the rule in Shelley’s Case, what 
Harvard students are really acquiring for their $40,000 in tuition is the 
knowledge of how to assume their rightful place in the nation’s elite. This 
socialization into what Granfield calls “collective eminence” occurs primarily 
outside the classroom and has as much to do with shaping placement choices as 
it reflects these opportunities.57 Anthony Chase’s lunchtime talk typifies this 
socialization process. Schools like Harvard routinely bring in speakers who 
represent the cutting edge of professional practice.58 By observing and interacting 
with these leaders, students get to see firsthand how successful lawyers present 
Sander, supra note 2, at 451 n.225, also does not establish that blacks do not benefit from 
being admitted to more selective schools. See Holzer & Neumark, supra note 33, at 549 
(discussing the Loury and Garman study and concluding that “blacks with lower SAT scores 
are not necessarily worse off when they are admitted to a more selective college than they 
would have otherwise been; instead, their average gain from having been admitted is not as 
high as that observed among whites”). Ian Ayres and Rick Brooks make a similar argument 
(much more rigorously) in their response to Sander in this issue. See Ian Ayres & Richard 
Brooks, Does Affirmative Action Reduce the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
____, [manuscript at 15-18] (2005). 
56.R OBERT GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND 
BEYOND (1992). I often tell students that this is the best book written about Harvard Law 
School that no one has ever read. 
57. Id. at 123-67 (arguing that professional socialization encourages students to 
suppress competition for grades while at the same time leads them to transform their initial 
interest in public service and social justice into a belief that the best and perhaps only way to 
further these ends is to take a job in a large corporate law firm). 
58. Although schools outside of the top tier do this as well, because of their broader 
alumni base and greater resources, it is safe to say that elite schools are able to engage in 
more of this kind of socialization than their less highly ranked peers. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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themselves and pick up invaluable lessons about what it takes to succeed in the 
real world. As the example also underscores, the mechanisms by which students 
are socialized in elite schools frequently provide important opportunities for 
relationship building. 
The network effects of elite schools are so obvious that one would think that 
they would have to be a large part of any examination of the benefits of attending 
such institutions. Yet Sander ignores them entirely. The graduates of top schools 
go on to occupy prominent positions in the professions, industry, government, and 
the arts. Having the opportunity to form relationships with these future leaders is 
clearly helpful to one’s ability to build a successful career in virtually any field. 
Moreover, as Anthony Chase’s story highlights, school ties extend well beyond 
friends or even classmates. Being a Harvard, Yale, or Stanford graduate means 
being inserted into an exclusive club that extends back for more than one hundred 
years and forward with every new graduating class. The simple fact that one is a 
“Harvard man” or a “Stanford woman” opens up opportunities for relationship 
building across generations and domains of expertise and interest. Whether it is 
being invited back as a distinguished alumnus, exchanging pleasantries at the Yale 
Club, or simply breaking the ice in conversation in a job interview with a fellow 
NYU grad, being a member of this exclusive club pays handsome dividends 
throughout the course of one’s career. 
There is ample evidence that these elite networks are especially valuable for 
lawyers. When Smigel studied the partners of Wall Street law firms in the 1960s, 
for example, he found that an astounding 70% were graduates of either Harvard, 
Yale, or Columbia law school.59 In the intervening years, the tremendous growth 
in both the number and size of large law firms has caused most to expand the 
range of schools from which they are willing to hire new lawyers.60 Nevertheless, 
elite law school graduates continue to dominate law firm hiring.61 Indeed, 
although the AJD Study found graduates from every school tier working in large 
59.S MIGEL, supra note 20, at 39. He also concluded that 64% had also attended one of 
nineteen elite colleges, and fully 55% were also alumni of elite boarding schools. Id. at 72-
73. 
60. See ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE LARGE LAW FIRM 132-33 (1988) (noting that four large Chicago law firms increased 
their hiring of graduates from regional and local schools during the mid-1970s to early 
1980s). 
61. See Scott Jaschik & Douglas Lederman, If You Went Here, You’d Be Sitting Pretty 
Now, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, § 4A (Education Life Supplement), at 37 (reporting that 
according to a study by Brian Leiter of the University of Texas School of Law, “Harvard, 
Chicago, Michigan, Yale [and the] University of Virginia” send the most graduates to top 
law firms, and that at firms like New York’s Cravath, Swaine & Moore, almost half of the 
firm’s lawyers are graduates of Harvard, Columbia, and NYU). Based on this and other 
evidence, Jaschik and Lederman conclude, “If you want the option of joining the fast track, a 
prestige school is essential.” Id.; see also Angela Cheng, NLJ 250: Most Mentioned Law 
Schools, NAT’L L.J., Nov. 15, 2004, at S13 (noting that although law firm recruiters reported 
that they hired students from over two hundred law schools, elite schools like Georgetown, 
Harvard, and Virginia topped the list). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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law firms, only 9% of those in Tier 3 and 3% of those in Tier 4 were employed in 
firms with more than one hundred lawyers.62 The corresponding percentages for 
respondents in top ten and next-ten schools were 40% and 33% respectively.63 
The concentration of elite school graduates among the partners of these 
institutions is even greater. Thus in 1995, Mitu Gulati and I found that 70% of all 
of the partners in five large firms in top legal markets had graduated from one of 
the thirteen most prestigious law schools in the country.64 Ninety-three percent of 
Cleary Gottlieb’s partners graduated from these institutions.65 Studies of the 
backgrounds of leading lawyers in other high-profile positions show a similar 
prevalence of graduates of elite law schools.66 While there may be many factors 
that explain these patterns, a point to which I will return below, it should go 
without saying that being a part of a network that includes these powerful 
decisionmakers carries real value. 
The socialization and networking benefits of graduating from an elite 
school undoubtedly help to explain why a degree from such an institution is 
universally considered to be a valuable credential in the job market. Even if we 
credit Sander’s analysis of the information on starting salaries in the AJD 
Study, it is evident this credential provides a more visible and durable market 
signal than all but the highest grade point average. Over time, employers 
simply stop inquiring about grades.67 Similarly, applicants are likely to have an 
increasingly difficult time working their good grades into the conversation.68 
Where one went to law school, on the other hand, is always apparent. At the 
62.S e e  AJD STUDY, supra note 14, at 44 tbl.5.2. 
63. Id. 
64. Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 35, at 741 tbl.5. 
65. Id. 
66.S e e  Benjamin G. Davis, The Color Line in International Arbitration: An American 
Perspective, 14 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 461, 517 (2003) (surveying the backgrounds of lawyers 
involved in international arbitration and concluding that “[t]his combination of top-ranked 
schools, contacts and interaction appears to be a non-trivial set of relations enhancing 
international commercial arbitration specialist human capital”). 
67. For example, the fact that a large California firm continues to place substantial 
weight on law school grades even for lateral partnership candidates was sufficiently 
newsworthy that it provoked a lengthy profile in the New York Law Journal. Anthony Lin, 
Law School Grades Paramount at Gibson Dunn—Even for Laterals, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 10, 
2003, at 1. In addition to pointing out how rare the firm’s practice was—and how amusing it 
was to many of the firm’s competitors (and insulting to some of its candidates)—the article 
also stressed that the firm applied its cutoff in a manner consistent with the primary value of 
graduating from an elite law school. As the managing partner made clear, “[t]he grade 
requirement varies according to law school . . . so that lawyers who graduated from schools 
such as Harvard are accepted if they rank within the top quarter of their class. Graduates of 
lower-ranked schools need to do considerably better.” Id. This is simply an extension of the 
metric described above that requires graduates of lower-status schools to receive 
significantly higher grades than their peers from elite schools in order to receive equivalent 
consideration. 
68. Consider the reaction that those who constantly talk about their grade point average 
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same time, firms have traditionally used the number of elite law school 
graduates they employ as a means of signaling their quality to clients and 
potential recruits.69 Although superstar grades and other academically related 
honors such as law review membership and Supreme Court clerkships can also 
be used for this purpose,70 cumulative grade point averages cannot. 
As important as these socialization, networking, and credentialing benefits 
of an elite law degree are for all aspiring lawyers, there are good reasons to 
believe that they are especially valuable—both singly and, most importantly, in 
combination—for black lawyers. Black law students are far less likely than 
their white peers to have absorbed the ways of eliteness at home or in their 
earlier educational experiences.71 As a result, my interviews are filled with 
examples of black lawyers whose eyes were opened to the mores of the power 
elite while in law school, and with cautionary tales about what happens to those 
who failed to learn these lessons.72 Similarly, in a world that continues to be 
dominated with negative images and stereotypes about blacks, most of the 
black lawyers in my sample, like Anthony Chase, have found that having 
relationships and connections with classmates and fellow alumni who have 
been able to steer them business or otherwise vouch for their competence has 
69. See ABEL, supra note 16, at 206 (noting the connection between firm status and the 
educational background of a firm’s lawyers); NELSON, supra note 60, at 66 (same). 
70. As the article on Gibson Dunn makes clear, this is a primary reason why that firm 
continues to ask lateral partners about their grades. See Lin, supra note 67, at 1 (noting that 
“in the status-conscious legal profession, high law school grades can have durable value as 
totems of prestige, feeding partners’ perceptions of themselves as an intellectual or 
meritocratic elite”). Even some of these other academically related honors, however, are 
more available to graduates from top schools. For example, an overwhelming majority of 
Supreme Court law clerks come from schools ranked at the very top of the law school 
hierarchy. Similarly, because of their greater resources, elite schools offer more 
opportunities for students to acquire valuable credentials, for example, by participating in 
one of the many journals these schools tend to operate outside of the school’s main law 
review. I am grateful to Bill Kidder for reminding me of this fact. 
71. In our study of black Harvard Law School graduates, for example, almost fifty 
percent of those from the 1970s had parents who worked in blue collar jobs, with many of 
the rest coming from households where one or both parents were low-level office workers or 
civil servants. Although the percentage of blacks from such backgrounds has declined with 
each passing decade, nearly one-third of all black graduates from the 1990s continue to hail 
from working class roots. See WILKINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 28. 
72. Interview 19, at 8 (June 9, 1997) (“When I first arrived at Yale . . . I was invited to 
a reception at [a dean’s] home, where he showed me his corkscrew collection. I really 
thought I was in the twilight zone viewing that!”). As this son of a factory worker, who is 
now a senior lawyer in the general counsel’s office of a major corporation, went on to 
sheepishly admit, “I collect vintage watches and corkscrews myself.” Compare id.  with 
Interview 96, at 28 (Oct. 11, 1998) (recalling how a fellow black summer clerk from Howard 
“showed up in an orange velvet sports jacket” and remembering thinking “[t]his is not what 
you ought to be doing at this place”). The informant, a black lawyer from a small town in 
Michigan, had learned what he “ought to be doing” at the large in-house legal department 
where he and the unsuspecting student from Howard were both interning during his time as a 
student at the University of Michigan Law School.  WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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played a critical role in their success.73 And virtually all believe—whether or 
not they attended such an institution themselves—that having an elite law 
school degree is an invaluable tool in overcoming the initial barriers that make 
whites skeptical of their competence and hesitate before giving them important 
opportunities—especially, as Chase discovered, when times get tough.74 The 
sum total of all of these benefits provides blacks who attend elite schools with a 
significant advantage in the job market.75 
The numbers bear this out. In 1995, I surveyed the nation’s largest 250 law 
firms to determine how many associates these firms hired in the last year, how 
many of those in this group were black, and where all of these new recruits 
73. See Chambers et al., supra note 33, at 418 n.30 (noting that minorities “are 
significantly more likely than whites to feel they benefited from friends made at Michigan 
and from contacts with Michigan alumni after graduation”). To be sure, not every black law 
student has taken full advantage of this important opportunity. Several black lawyers in my 
sample acknowledge that they spent far too little time interacting with their white peers 
while in law school. Although many believe that their careers have benefited from contacts 
with fellow black students over the years, a point I discuss below, most of those in this group 
now view their decision to confine the majority of their social interaction to other blacks as a 
serious mistake—one that they are working hard to see that today’s black students do not 
repeat. 
74.S e e  id. at 419 (noting that minorities “place a higher value on the prestige of a 
Michigan Law School degree than whites do”). Black Harvard Law School graduates appear 
to place similar weight on the prestige of their degree. See WILKINS ET AL., supra note 33, at 
49 tbl.25 (reporting that respondents selected the prestige of their degree as one of the most 
important factors in their success); see also Wilkins & Gulati, Third Year Law Students, 
supra note 54, at 1230 (reporting that minority students rate law school prestige as more 
important than grades and that white students reach the opposite conclusion). In a poignant 
and revealing story, a respondent who attended a local law school recounted how his mentor 
mistakenly assumed that he had gone to Harvard. “I often wonder if he had known [where I 
went to law school] what kind of assumptions he would have made.” Interview 108, at 51 
(Sept. 16, 1998). 
75. As one respondent summed it up: 
I have rarely encountered any problems that are a result of race in my career as an attorney . . 
. . Being fair-skinned and basically projecting what I would describe as fairly straightforward 
upper middle class values in the way in which I basically function, operate, interact and deal 
with people, I’m not sure that the first thing a lot of people ever think about when they meet 
me is that I’m black. I mean, sooner or later they do, for many reasons that I know and many 
reasons that I don’t know. But the fact of the matter is that, the combination of I think those 
particular characteristics combined with my educational background and pedigree, and then 
throw in a lot of experiences that I’ve had at a fairly early point in my life that basically 
resulted in my developing the ability to sort of negotiate the world in which I was operating 
in, made it possible for me to kind of think about opportunity without necessarily first 
thinking about the possibility of impediments based on race. And I must say that in most 
cases that has been borne out. I think that I have been fortunate, and I think many of my 
colleagues, people of my vintage have been fortunate in arriving on the scene with the right 
credentials at a time when institutions were absolutely desperate to find the right black. And I 
know that when you walk in with a Harvard degree, a Brooks Brothers suit and a great set of 
credentials and experiences that a lot of white guys are likely to say, hey, what’s the big deal. 
Got one; hey, this is easy; this isn’t hard. 
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went to law school.76 One-third of the firms responded to the survey. In these 
firms, the percentage of blacks graduating from one of thirteen specified elite 
schools was somewhat higher (57.3%) than the number of white graduates 
(51.7%) from these same institutions. The differences grew larger, however, at 
the top end of the elite spectrum. For example, in the two cities with the highest 
response rates, New York (51%) and Washington, D.C. (50%), more than half 
of all black associates hired graduated from either Harvard or the top schools in 
the local market: Columbia and NYU in New York or Georgetown in 
Washington, D.C. The corresponding numbers for whites were 40.4% in New 
York and 23.2% in Washington, D.C.77 
When we turn our attention to partners, the percentage of blacks who have 
broken into this exclusive club who are also graduates of elite law schools is 
even more startling. For example, in 1993, 77% of the identifiably black 
partners profiled in the ABA’s directory of minority partners in majority-
corporate law firms were elite school graduates as I have defined that term.78 
As with the previous comparison, this percentage is somewhat but not 
dramatically higher than the percentage of white partners who graduated from 
these institutions in a sample of five top firms from around the country.79 Once 
again, however, when we look more closely, it becomes clear that black 
partners tend to be concentrated at the top end of the range of elite schools. 
Thus, nearly half (47%) of the black partners graduated from either Harvard or 
Yale. Although two firms in the sample (Boston’s Ropes & Gray and New 
York’s Cleary Gottlieb) have percentages of white Harvard and Yale partners 
that rival this total, the average for all five firms was 33%. An analysis of the 
black partners listed in the 1996 directory of the Chicago Committee on 
Minorities in Large Law Firms reveals a similar pattern.80 Seventy-three 
percent of those listed are elite school graduates, with 53% being the graduates 
of only three institutions: Harvard, Michigan, and Northwestern. As a rough 
comparison, in that same year 67% of the partners at Chicago’s Sidley & 
Austin, one of the largest and most prestigious firms in the city,  were elite law 
school graduates, with less than one-third coming from the three schools that 
contributed over half of the entire population of black partners. 
76. For a more detailed description of this study, see Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 35, 
at 561-63, app. at 622 tbl.3 & 623 tbl.4.  
77. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 35, at 561 – 2.; Wilkins, Rollin’ on the River, 
supra n. 35, at 534. Although Georgetown was not one of our thirteen elite schools, it is the 
best law school in the Washington, D.C., area. Given the substantial local effects in the 
market for lawyers, although Georgetown may not count as an elite school nationally, it does 
in the Washington, D.C. market. I return to these local effects below. 
78.S e e  Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 35, at 563-64, 624 app. tbl.5.  
79. See id. at 741 tbl.5 (noting that 70% of the partners in a sample of five large law 
firms graduated from elite law schools). 
80.S e e  C HICAGO  COMM. ON MINORITIES IN LARGE  LAW  FIRMS,  DIRECTORY OF 
MINORITY PARTNERS (1996-1997).  WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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None of these comparisons definitively establishes that black lawyers are 
more in need of elite school credentials than comparable whites. Nevertheless, 
they are consistent with the countless anecdotal reports that I have collected 
from respondents concerning the importance of elite school credentials for 
blacks in law and other high-status jobs.81 As one black partner in Chicago put 
it in a recent news account, “If you’re not from Harvard, not from Yale, not 
from Chicago, you’re not adequate. You’re not taken seriously.”82 Whether or 
not this is literally true, it does appear that black lawyers are taken more 
seriously if they have elite educational credentials.83 
Sander seems to argue that affirmative action in the job market will make 
up for any problems that black lawyers encounter as a result of eliminating 
affirmative action in law school. According to Sander, “the strong positive 
coefficient associated with black lawyers in our regression shows that the legal 
market as a whole is more willing, not less willing, to hire blacks into good 
jobs” and that it is “obvious” that they would continue to do so in the absence 
of affirmative action.84 Needless to say, justifying the elimination of 
81. Michele Landis Dauber, in her response in this issue, cites an impressive array of 
research from scholars, employing a variety of methodologies, indicating that blacks receive 
less benefit from their credentials in the labor market than do whites, particularly in high-
status professions such as law. See Michele Landis Dauber, The Big Muddy, 57 STAN. L. 
REV. ____, (manuscript at 4-5 nn.17-19 & accompanying text) (2005) David Chambers et al. 
reach a similar conclusion in their response with respect to the importance of elite credentials 
for black law professors. See David L. Chambers et al., The Real Impact of Eliminating 
Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s 
Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. ____, (manuscript at 27-28) (2005) (reporting that 60.1% of all 
black law professors attended top twenty schools, with 48.1% graduating from the top ten 
and 25.7% from Harvard and Yale alone). All of this research is consistent with the view that 
blacks need better credentials if they are to have an equal chance to succeed in markets 
where their value continues to be discounted. I discuss how the existence of affirmative 
action affects these findings below. 
82. Ann Davis, Big Jump in Minority Associates, But . . . , NAT’L L.J., Apr. 29, 1996, 
at 1, 22. 
83. This is especially true for blacks who are trying to build national, as opposed to 
local, careers. The black lawyers who find themselves pushed down into Tier 4 or 5 schools 
under Sander’s plan will be much more likely than they are today to build careers close to 
where their schools are located. Their degrees will simply be more valuable the closer they 
stay to home. For those who are bumped down to local and commuter schools, home may be 
the only place their degrees have value. A few graduates from Suffolk University Law 
School (almost all of whom were in the top of their class) receive job offers from large law 
firms in Boston. Many more populate the small and midsized firms in New England that ply 
their trade in the local civil and criminal courts and represent local businesses in their 
dealings with others of similar size and with city and state officials. Virtually none go on to 
work in Chicago or Los Angeles. As a manager of a website which helps law students find 
jobs recently put it, “Going to Loyola Law School can lead you to a pretty lucrative, 
satisfying life in Los Angeles . . . . But if you want to have any chance of going national, you 
really have to be at U.C.L.A. or U.S.C.” Jaschik & Lederman, supra note 61 (quoting Adam 
Avitable, a manager of Legal Authority). The more blacks attend schools like Suffolk, the 
fewer black lawyers we are likely to see on the national stage. 
84. Sander, supra note 2, at 468. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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affirmative action in one realm by assuming its continuation in another is 
ironic, to say the least. I return to this irony in Part IV. But once we inspect 
more closely the evidence Sander cites from the AJD Study to prove his point 
that blacks receive “substantial preference” in the job market, it is clear that to 
the extent that such a preference exists, it is largely the product of the very 
affirmative action programs in law schools that Sander seeks to abolish. 
Sander treats the success of the black graduates from elite law schools as if 
this were solely a benefit to the individuals involved. This seriously 
underestimates the importance of developing a viable black elite. Blacks who 
have achieved positions of power and influence in the legal profession, most of 
whom, as we have seen, are graduates of elite law schools, have played a 
critical role in opening the doors of opportunity for other black lawyers.85 
Black partners routinely serve on hiring committees, form organizations 
dedicated to improving the hiring and retention of minority lawyers, and devote 
countless hours to mentoring black associates and law students. As many 
blacks have left law firms for in-house counsel positions, these newly minted 
purchasing agents have sought to use their new positions of authority to 
distribute work to minority lawyers and to press firms to report their progress 
on diversity and improve upon it. 
These efforts have improved the job prospects of every black law student. 
Predictably, recent black graduates from elite schools have benefited the most 
from these efforts by their alumni predecessors. This, of course, is simply a 
reflection of the many benefits of joining the elite networks to which such 
graduates automatically belong. But black lawyers from lower-ranked schools 
are also better off as a result of the doors that have been opened by elite black 
lawyers. Black partners have been at the forefront of pushing law firms and 
other employers to look beyond the graduates of top law schools when 
recruiting black students. Employing a variation of Willie Sutton’s famous quip 
about the reason why he robbed banks—“it’s where the money is!”—black 
partners and general counsel have vigorously pressed firms to recruit at 
historically black law schools and to attend minority job fairs in order to 
increase the number of black applicants that they see. At the same time, black 
general counsel have worked to ensure that minority law firms gain access to at 
least some corporate business and that blacks in small- and medium-sized firms 
are included as well. These efforts have been critical in producing the 
improvement in the earnings prospects of black graduates from lower-ranked 
schools identified in the AJD Study. 
85. I chronicle these efforts in Wilkins, supra note 32, at 1568-71. Once again, it is 
important to note that this finding is consistent with research in other areas demonstrating 
that successful blacks help other blacks to succeed. See Holzer & Neumark, supra note 33, at 
499 (discussing studies that show that “black owners/managers hire more black employees 
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The examples Sander cites clearly demonstrate this effect. Sander argues 
that “there is no observable difference in outcomes” for black graduates with 
GPAs of 3.5 or higher, regardless of whether that student graduated from 
“NYU or Northwestern, at the elite end, or schools such as Howard, Texas 
Southern, or Santa Clara University, on the low-prestige end.”86 If this is true, 
it is almost certainly the product of the tireless efforts of the past beneficiaries 
of affirmative action. In 1993, for example, Texas Lawyer ran an article entitled 
Perceived Notions: Recruiters Pigeonhole TSU Graduates, Leaving Top 
Students in the Cold.87 The article bemoans the fact that “firms that talk 
grandly about increasing their minority hiring don’t look to do it at [Texas 
Southern University’s] law school, where half of the 587 students are African 
American . . . .”88 As proof of this neglect, the article cites a TSU student who 
did not receive a single offer from any large law firm in Texas even though she 
graduated “magna cum laude, second in her class, [was a] law review editor, 
and . . . clerk[ed] at the Texas Supreme Court.”89 Revealingly, when 
questioned about why the young woman failed to attract his firm’s interest, one 
hiring partner explained “we usually can fill our needs at the top schools.”90 
Clearly, there was no “preference” operating in favor of top black graduates 
from lower-ranked schools in 1993.91 To the extent that this reality has 
changed—and remember, we have only two years  of salary data to suggest that 
it has—it is almost certainly the result of the actions of black graduates from 
“the top schools” who have insisted that firms look beyond their ranks to fill 
their hiring needs. 
Indeed, the presence of black lawyers in the nation’s legal, business, and 
government elites confers benefits to the black community as a whole—and to 
our nation and to the world—that extend far beyond the important but arguably 
parochial employment prospects of other black lawyers. Sander alludes to the 
collateral costs of affirmative action: “the national competition between 
Democrats and Republicans, . . . interracial goodwill, the belief held by whites 
that they are ‘already’ making sufficient sacrifices for the cause of racial 
justice, and the credibility of institutions that are often trapped in deceptions by 
their own policies.”92 He fails, however, to mention any of the collateral 
benefits associated with creating a significant, although still fledgling, black 
86. Sander, supra note 2, at 466. 
87. Richard Connelly, Preconceived Notions: Recruiters Pigeonhole TSU Graduates, 




91. See also Rita H. Jensen, Minorities Didn’t Share in Firm Growth, NAT’L L.J., Feb. 
19, 1990, at 1 (chastising firms for not recruiting at historically black law schools such as 
Howard). 
92. Sander, supra note 2, at 371 n.7. As indicated above, noticeably absent from this 
list is any unfairness to white applicants. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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presence among the nation’s elite. Black graduates of elite institutions, virtually 
all of whom Sander would classify as beneficiaries of affirmative action, have 
played pivotal roles in increasing home ownership in minority communities,93 
reducing employment discrimination in large corporations,94 making AIDS 
drugs more affordable in South Africa,95 and, as we recently saw in the case of 
Barack Obama’s stirring speech at the Democratic National Convention, 
reminding all Americans of the ties that bind them, regardless of race, religion, 
or political affiliation.96 To fail to account for these and other similar benefits is 
to ignore the extent to which our profession and our country have been 
fundamentally transformed for the better in the last four decades. 
Of course, one can acknowledge all of these benefits and still credit the 
weaker form of Sander’s argument that affirmative action is no longer 
necessary for the continued production of these gains. Once again, it is 
important to emphasize that unlike the benefits chronicled above, any such 
claim rests on little more than speculation and hope. The speculation is that the 
graduates of lesser-ranked schools will be at least as successful as their 
predecessors from more highly ranked schools at building long-term careers 
even though they lack the multiple and reinforcing benefits that such a degree 
provides.97 The hope is that those who have already benefited from affirmative 
action will continue to be successful in a world in which their own credentials 
are subject to even greater attack. In Part IV, I will offer some additional 
reasons to doubt both propositions. For now, however, I simply want to 
maintain that neither the income data in the AJD Study, nor any of the other 
studies that Sander cites, come anywhere close to proving his sweeping claim 
that the “conventional wisdom that elite schools are the only path to coveted 
93.S e e  Mortgage Group Joins NAACP to Help Blacks Purchase Homes, CHI. TRIB., 
Jan. 22, 1999, at 1 (describing a partnership spearheaded by Franklin Raines, the company’s 
black former CEO). Raines is a graduate of Harvard Law School. Needless to say, Raines’s 
recent departure from Fannie Mae in no way undermines the value of the work that he did 
while there. 
94. See America’s Top Black Lawyers, BLACK ENTERPRISE, Nov. 2003, at 121, 128, 
146; Coke Names Patrick, Civil Rights Lawyer, as General Counsel, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 
2001, at B2. Deval Patrick is also a Harvard Law School graduate. 
95. Vivian Chen, Master of the Game, MINORITY  L.J., Summer 2001, at 17, 20 
(describing Merck General Counsel Kenneth Frazier’s role in the company’s decision to 
reduce the cost of the company’s AIDS drugs in Africa). Frazier, like Raines and Patrick, is 
a black graduate of Harvard Law School. 
96. See Jonathan Alter, The Audacity of Hope, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 27, 2004, at 74. As 
anyone who has followed Obama’s meteoric rise already knows, the fact that he is a Harvard 
Law School graduate has been central to his appeal. 
97. Indeed, there are good grounds for worrying that under Sander’s plan the graduates 
of highly ranked schools might not be as successful as they are today. In addition to 
whatever educational benefits it brings, the “critical mass” of blacks who currently attend top 
schools also generates cohort effects that have played an important role in career building. If 
the number of black students attending these institutions were to decline significantly, future 
black graduates of these institutions would be less able to call on black classmates for 
information, opportunities, and support. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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jobs” is false. In the absence of such proof, it is hard to see why black students 
who are currently admitted to schools in the first three tiers of the law school 
hierarchy should be willing to trade in the proven benefits of their elite status 
for the speculative gains from improving their grades that Sander promises. 
The same is true of the psychological benefits that Sander argues blacks 
would gain in a world without affirmative action. Although he initially 
discounts such “soft” issues, a large part of why Sander believes that blacks 
will be better off under the regime he proposes has to do with the benefits to 
black lawyers of living in a world in which their success will not be discounted 
by presumptions about affirmative action. The benefits of such a world should 
not be minimized.98 Whether blacks are likely to receive these benefits in the 
world Sander anticipates, however, is a much more difficult question. Although 
affirmative action undoubtedly contributes to the feeling among many whites 
that blacks are less competent, both the lessons of history and the findings of 
contemporary research suggest that the roots of these perceptions run far deeper 
in the human psyche than any set of policies or practices of specific institutions. 
At the same time, the socialization, networking, and, to a lesser but still 
significant extent, credentialing benefits of attending an elite school exist 
independently of whether one is or is not considered an affirmative action hire. 
Given these two dynamics, it is speculative at best whether black graduates 
from top schools would be better off—the standard Sander sets for himself—in 
a world in which some whites might have a harder time consciously dismissing 
their competence (and in which some blacks might find it easier to have 
confidence in themselves), but in which black lawyers also have fewer 
protections against the unconscious stereotypes and biases that are likely to 
remain. 
Although the calculation is admittedly more complex for blacks who attend 
lower-status schools, Sander has still not satisfied his burden of persuasion that 
the costs of affirmative action to this less-privileged group outweigh its 
benefits. 
98. Judge Edwards sums up this value with his usual eloquence: 
[W]hen I graduated from Cornell, and later with honors from the University of Michigan 
Law School, no one doubted that I had made it on my own merits; indeed, I often received 
backhanded compliments from people who said that I must be talented, because I had been 
admitted to Cornell and Michigan and had succeeded despite my race. I had the advantage of 
an assumption that I was smart, and I believed it. 
See Harry T. Edwards, Personal Reflections on 30 Years of Legal Education for Minority 
Students, 37 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES 38, 39 (1994). As Judge Edwards goes on to say, this 
is one respect in which his life has been easier than that of his son, who has grown up 
without such a presumption. Id. at 40. Notwithstanding this cost, however, Judge Edwards 
makes clear that affirmative action policies such as those instituted by his alma mater, the 
University of Michigan, have played a crucial role in opening the doors of opportunity for 
black lawyers. Id. at 39-43. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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III. JUST MAKING IT 
Sander has performed a valuable service by focusing attention on the fate 
of black graduates from local and regional law schools. This group is largely 
absent from the writings of academics studying diversity in the legal 
profession, including my own. As Sander makes clear, this is an important 
omission. A majority of black law students—although as we have seen, not as 
large a majority as Sander’s analysis might lead one to believe—attend such 
schools. If affirmative action is harming most of these students, then this should 
properly count as a significant cost of how we currently conduct law school 
admissions. 
Sander produces strong evidence to support his claim that this is indeed the 
case. Attrition and bar failure rates are alarmingly high among this group.99 Yet 
before we conclude that even these students are harmed by affirmative action, it 
is important that we both take a closer look at some of the statistics Sander 
proffers, and at the same time step back from these numbers to observe the 
general fate of those likely to attend lower-ranked law schools. When we do, 
we see that it is far from clear that the majority of black law students in this 
most vulnerable group are harmed more than they are helped by affirmative 
action—which is, it bears repeating, Sander’s sole claim. 
Let’s begin at the bottom. Sander concedes that, under his plan, 14% of all 
the black students currently admitted to law school would no longer be eligible 
for admission to any school.100 This amounts to 524 blacks who currently have 
the chance of becoming lawyers but who would no longer have this possibility 
under Sander’s proposal. Sander dismisses this cost on the ground that these 
students “have such weak academic credentials that they add only a 
comparative handful of attorneys to total national production.”101 Sander’s own 
calculations, however, suggest that this dismissal is far too quick. 
Notwithstanding their comparatively weak entering credentials, 65% of 
matriculants in this category graduate from law school. Twenty-nine percent 
eventually pass the bar and become lawyers.102 This translates into 152 
practicing lawyers who will never have an opportunity to be lawyers under 
Sander’s plan. 
This is not a trivial loss. For starters, it is only seventeen short of the 
number of new lawyers that Sander claims his plan will produce.103 Thus, even 
99. Sander, supra note 2, at 437 tbl.5.5, 446 tbl.6.2. 
100. Id. at 473 tbl.8.2. 
101. Id. at 474. 
102. Id. This is an example of where Sander cites the more shocking first-time failure 
rate (81%) in text and only gives the still low, but significantly higher (this time, almost 40% 
higher) eventual passage rate in the footnote. As I indicate below, it is the latter statistic that 
is the most important. 
103. I arrived at this number by subtracting the number of black lawyers eventually 
passing the bar under the present system in Sander’s Table 8.2 (1981), id. at 473 tbl.8.2, WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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if one credits all of Sander’s admittedly optimistic assumptions, his plan loses 
almost as many black lawyers out of the bottom of the distribution as it gains 
from increasing bar passage rates for those in the middle.104 Moreover, even if 
one were to believe that it was a net gain to society, or even to the black 
community, to replace the 152 black lawyers excluded by Sander’s plan with 
the 169 blacks gained by eliminating affirmative action—a question I address 
below—there can be no question that with respect to those blacks who will no 
longer have a chance to become lawyers, the question of their exclusion is not 
trivial  to them. Once again, in a proposal that claims to value blacks “as 
individuals,” this cost certainly cannot be overlooked. 
Sander is likely to respond that he is valuing the humanity of the blacks in 
this part of the distribution precisely by not allowing them to embark on the 
long, difficult, and, as Sander rightly emphasizes, often expensive path of 
becoming a lawyer when they have only a three out of ten chance of actually 
achieving their goal.105 Upon close inspection, however, even this well-
intentioned concern rings hollow given the alternative choices blacks in this 
part of the distribution are likely to have. Although less than one-third of those 
excluded by Sander’s plan currently become lawyers, almost two-thirds 
become law school graduates. This is a credential that we should not assume to 
be worthless. 
One way to remember this is to notice that, according to Sander’s estimate, 
approximately seven percent of law school graduates never even bother to take 
the bar.106 For some of these students, this was undoubtedly their plan from the 
start. For others, the decision to forgo the potential benefits, but certain costs, 
of taking the bar exam is the result of a complex mix of events that transpire 
during law school, including changes in family status, evolving interests, and 
perceptions about the job market.107 In either case, the education—and the 
credential—can still be quite valuable. As we in the academy continually 
assert, legal education is good preparation for a wide range of activities that go 
from the number Sander claims will eventually become lawyers under his scenario (2150), 
id. Once again, the fact that Sander predicts that first-time passage rates will increase 
substantially under his plan is less important than the total number of new black lawyers that 
his proposal would ultimately produce. 
104. I say the middle because, as we have seen, blacks at the top of the distribution—
the ones most likely to attend elite law schools—almost never fail to graduate from law 
school and eventually pass the bar. 
105. Sander, supra note 2, at 481-82. 
106. Id. at 473 tbl.8.2. The number is the difference between “Graduates (2004 or 
Later)” (2802) and “Graduates Taking the Bar” (2552). This number may actually overstate 
the percentage of law graduates who do not take the bar, since the Bar Passage Study 
included some respondents for whom bar information could not be determined. As 
elsewhere, I am simply relying on Sander’s reporting of the data, upon which he bases his 
own calculations. I am grateful to David Chambers for bringing this possible discrepancy to 
my attention. 
107.S e e  Clydesdale, supra note 11, at 726 (discussing the importance of “life events” 
in analyzing the results of the Bar Passage Study). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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far beyond the practice of law. Even if one dismisses much of this rhetoric as 
self-serving, there are good reasons to suspect that having a law degree is 
valuable in a range of jobs—real estate, insurance, law enforcement, human 
resources, and, of course, the business of law itself (i.e., paralegals, court 
clerks, court reporters, etc.)—that do not require one to be a member of the bar. 
In addition to gaining substantive knowledge and a visible credential that 
employers are likely to value, law graduates working in these fields will also 
benefit from having formed relationships with classmates who do become 
lawyers, many of whom will be in a position to assist their law-related careers. 
Given these potential benefits, it is far from clear that the 188 blacks with index 
scores under 480 (Sander’s cutoff point for being admitted to law school under 
his plan) who currently graduate from law school but who do not pass the bar 
would be better off in a world in which they were not allowed to enroll at all. 
This is particularly true in light of the fact that the other avenues for social 
and economic advancement open to this group are likely to be equally 
problematic. It is possible, of course, that blacks with low index scores have 
simply missed their true calling in medicine, the arts, or some other promising 
route to a high-paying and high-prestige career. It seems more likely, however, 
that these are students who will face long odds no matter what they attempt.108 
The real question from the point of view of students in this position—once 
again, the sole criterion Sander sets out for himself—is whether the risks and 
benefits associated with going to law school are better or worse than the reward 
structure of the alternatives that this group is likely to have either elsewhere in 
higher education or directly in the job market. 
Needless to say, I do not have the information necessary to answer this 
question here. Given what we know about the earnings of black college 
graduates, particularly those from working class backgrounds whose degrees 
are not from elite colleges or universities, it seems wrong to presume that even 
a fully informed, rational, utility-maximizing black student in this position 
would not consider law school a relatively good bet. According to the AJD 
Study, even a student graduating at the bottom of his or her class in a Tier 4 law 
school and entering private practice can expect to earn $50,000 a year within 
two years of graduation.109 Although a far cry from the princely sums paid to 
108. Given that scores on standardized tests, which under Sander’s formula are the 
main criteria constituting this group, are highly correlated with wealth, it is likely that those 
who fall in this group are more likely to come from working class families and to have 
attended less prestigious secondary and undergraduate schools. See  Jesse M. Rothstein, 
College Performance Predictions and the SAT, 121 J.  ECONOMETRICS 297, 298 (2004) 
(discussing the “acknowledged correlation between SAT scores and student socioeconomic 
status”); see also Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education, 72 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1, 42-43 (1997) (reporting that 50.7% of blacks in the Bar Passage Study came from 
lower-middle-class backgrounds). As a result, these black students are likely to have fewer 
employment opportunities when they graduate from college. 
109. It is important to pause to note here that this is not significantly below the median 
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first-year associates at top law firms, it still compares quite favorably to entry-
level salaries for college graduates in many fields. Just to put the matter in 
some perspective, the median salary for all black college graduates one year 
after graduation in 1999-2000 was $30,506.110 For those blacks with low 
entering credentials who go on to beat the odds and not only become lawyers 
but build successful careers in areas such as personal injury law or worker’s 
compensation, the gap in earning potential between college and law school 
graduates over the course of a career can be substantially higher. Even those 
who fail to become lawyers may receive an important earnings boost over the 
course of their careers from the skills, credentialing, and relationships they 
received from going to law school.111 Ex ante, these rewards may outweigh the 
risk that a black matriculant will end up with neither a bar card nor a law 
degree for the time, effort, out-of-pocket expenses, and forgone opportunities 
that they invested in trying to obtain these goods. 
Indeed, it is hard to see how one can answer the question of whether law 
school is a good investment for black students enrolling in schools at the 
bottom of the law school hierarchy without knowing much more than we 
currently do about whether such schools are a good investment for any student. 
As both the Bar Passage Study and AJD Study make clear, students enrolled in 
such schools are less likely to graduate and pass the bar and earn substantially 
less than their peers from more highly ranked institutions. And while some go 
on to build successful and financially rewarding careers, by most accounts the 
life of the average solo practitioner or “bread and butter” tort lawyer is getting 
increasingly difficult with each passing year.112 Whether law schools in this 
range remain a good deal in such an environment is something that no one 
really knows—least of all the schools whose survival depends on persuading a 
practice. See AJD STUDY, supra note 14, at 44 tbl.5.2 (showing the median starting salary for 
Tier 4 graduates who go into solo practice as $57,500 and for those who work in firms of 
two to twenty lawyers as $54,500). It is also higher than the median salary for graduates 
from these institutions who start their career in state or local government ($45,000) and 
within striking distance of the median salary of those who begin their careers with the 
federal government ($56,000), which is also very close to the mean ($56,182) for all 
graduates of these institutions. Id. 
110. See N AT’L  CTR. FOR EDUC.  STATISTICS,  U.S.  DEP’T OF EDUC.,  A  DESCRIPTIVE 
SUMMARY OF 1999-2000 BACHELOR’S DEGREE RECIPIENTS 1 YEAR LATER WITH AN ANALYSIS 
OF TIME TO DEGREE: STATISTICAL ANALYSIS REPORTS 127 (2003). 
111. Indeed, as Linda Wightman speculates, this may account for why a substantial 
number of blacks who fail the exam for the first time never retake it. See Linda F. 
Wightman, Through a Different Lens: A Reply to Stephan Thernstrom, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 
45, 55-56 (1998) (“The findings about single attempts also raise questions, however, about 
the utility of bar passage as a criterion in evaluating the success of admission decisions. How 
many of those graduates who did not attempt the bar a second time did so because passing 
was not necessary to entry or success in their chosen career?”). I return to this issue below. 
112. See, e.g., CARROLL SERON, THE BUSINESS OF PRACTICING LAW: THE WORK LIVES 
OF  SOLO AND SMALL-FIRM  ATTORNEYS  (1996); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, “The 
Impact That It Has Had Is Between People’s Ears”: Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and 
Plaintiffs’ Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453 (2000). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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steady stream of new recruits to believe that it is. As the AJD Study follows the 
class of 2000, we hope to shed some light on this and other similarly vexing 
questions about how the market for lawyers works at various levels of this 
increasingly stratified profession. Until we do, it will be very hard to untangle 
the fate of black lawyers (or law school graduates) from local and regional 
schools from a general assessment of the career returns from attending such 
institutions for all students. 
Finally, it is impossible to assess Sander’s proposal without pausing to 
consider the validity of the bar exam itself. As the above analysis indicates, the 
biggest obstacle faced by blacks in the part of the distribution Sander seeks to 
eliminate is the bar. Approximately, fifty percent of the blacks in this group 
who graduate from law school and who take the bar never pass it.113 Indeed, 
bar passage rates are at the core of the entire story Sander tells. By his own 
analysis, the number of blacks graduating from law school and taking the bar 
would decrease by 6.8% under his proposal. It is only because he predicts that 
eliminating affirmative action will significantly increase the number of blacks 
who pass the bar that he is able to assert that the overall production of black 
lawyers would increase if affirmative action were eliminated. 
Once we are clear on the mechanism by which Sander hopes to expand the 
size of the black bar, it is evident that there is another way that one might 
achieve the same objective. Rather than cutting off the opportunity that those 
with low index scores currently have to go to law school, we could instead 
change the bar exam so that more black law school graduates in this part of the 
distribution are able to pass it. Needless to say, for critics of affirmative action, 
even uttering such a proposal will serve as confirmation of the implicit 
message—although, as I have repeatedly emphasized, not the explicit 
argument—of Sander’s analysis: i.e., that regardless of whether affirmative 
action helps blacks seeking a legal education, it harms the legal profession and 
those it serves by allowing unqualified blacks to become lawyers. A full 
assessment of this critique would take me far beyond the scope of this brief 
Response—and beyond the scope of the criteria Sander posits for judging his 
claim. Given that so much of Sander’s proposal turns on bar passage rates, 
however, it is important to say a few words about the implicit assumption that 
bar exam scores are a good proxy for a law school graduate’s fitness to practice 
law. Although any argument that such exams have no relationship to quality 
would certainly strain credulity—just as it would be ridiculous to claim that law 
school grades have no predictive value in judging a student’s future ability to 
practice law—the assumption that bar passage (let alone one’s score on the bar 
exam)  is synonymous with legal competence has not only never been proven 
but is, given what we know about the exam and its history, implausible on its 
face. 
113. See Sander, supra n. 2, at 437.  As I indicate later in this Part, this is partially 
because many blacks who fail the first time never retake the exam. See infra p. 138 n.139  WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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In light of the history recounted in Part I, one does not have to go as far as 
George Bernard Shaw’s famous quip that “all professions . . . are . . . 
conspiracies against the laity” to conclude that bar examinations have as much 
to do with suppressing competition as ensuring competence.114 The statistics 
Sander cites toward the end of his article about falling bar passage rates in 
recent years are strong evidence that the attempt to use the bar examination as a 
means of restricting competition is not merely a thing of the past. Sander notes 
that between 1994 and 2003, “average bar passage rates across American 
jurisdictions dropped as many states raised the passing threshold.”115 Given 
everything else he has said in his article, this is a startling trend. Just two 
sentences above this quotation, Sander notes that in the last decade it appears 
that the black-white credentials gap for law school applicants has significantly 
narrowed “from about 170 points in the early 1990s to perhaps 130 or 140 
points now.”116 In other words, black applicants, who Sander has spent much 
of the last hundred pages asserting disproportionately come from the bottom of 
the credentials pool, are significantly better qualified by these measures than 
they were a decade ago. Indeed, as Sander makes clear at the beginning of the 
article, the entire population of law students is, on average, significantly better 
qualified than it was during the profession’s “golden age.” As he notes, “[b]y 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, admission to many law schools had become 
dramatically more competitive.”117 If anything, this trend has only accelerated 
in the intervening three decades. With the exception of a brief downturn during 
the 1991 recession and the “dot com” boom of the late 1990s, applications to 
law school have steadily increased from just over 60,000 in 1984 to over 
100,000 today.118 Although admissions have crept up as well, the conclusion is 
nevertheless inescapable that the qualifications of entering law students are 
higher than they have ever been before.119 
114.G EORGE BERNARD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA, at xv (1911). The claim that 
the primary goal of professional licensing is to protect the income and status of practitioners 
has been frequently invoked by critics on both the right and the left. See, e.g., MILTON 
FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 144-49 (1962); Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA 
Promulgate Ethical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639 (1981). 
115. Sander, supra note 2, at 475. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 377. 
118.L AW  SCH.  ADMISSION  COUNCIL, MINORITY  DATA  BOOK (2002); Law Sch. 
Admission Council, Volume Summary Data, at 
http://www.lsat.org/LSAC.asp?url=/lsac/lsac-volume-summary.asp (last visited Apr. 18, 
2005). 
119.S e e  Daniel R. Hansen, Do We Need the Bar Examination?: A Critical Evaluation 
of the Justifications for the Bar Examination and Proposed Alternatives, 45 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 1191, 1216 & nn.131-32 (1995) (documenting the rise in quality of law students); 
William C. Kidder, The Bar Examination and the Dream Deferred: A Critical Analysis of 
the MBE, Social Closure, and Racial and Ethnic Stratification, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 547 
(2004) (documenting the rise in the quality of law students). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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So why then are bar passage rates decreasing? Although one could 
undoubtedly spin many complex scenarios to explain this trend, in this case the 
simple market explanation appears to be the most persuasive. Faced with a 
legal profession that has quadrupled in size since 1960,120 lawyers in many 
jurisdictions have simply turned to lowering bar passage rates as a means of 
protecting themselves and their incomes from competition from new entrants. 
Bar passage rates have dropped sharply in states with desirable legal markets 
while remaining stable or actually rising in jurisdictions where lawyers are less 
likely to want to practice.121 At the same time, several states have recently 
instituted measures to make it more difficult for lawyers who are fully licensed 
in one jurisdiction to practice law in another. These measures range from 
making lawyers who want to relocate from one state to another retake the entire 
bar exam to enforcing unauthorized-practice rules against out-of-state lawyers 
even if all they are doing is counseling an in-state client about a transaction that 
may not even take place within the protesting state’s borders.122 It is hard to 
view these trends as anything other than an attempt by in-state lawyers to 
protect themselves from competition from lawyers seeking to move to more 
lucrative markets.123 Although these attempts have not always been successful, 
120.S e e  Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 
FORDHAM L. REV. 275 (1992) (documenting the rapid escalation in the number of lawyers 
since 1960); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
2004-2005, at 385 (2004) (reporting that there are now 952,000 lawyers in the United 
States). 
121. Passage rates in several Sun Belt states fell significantly between 1994 and 2002. 
For example, Florida’s passage rate fell from 84% in 1994 to 68% in 2002. California’s 
dropped from 56% to 45% during this period, while Georgia’s fell from 75% to 70%. States 
with large legal markets also experienced significant declines. Illinois’s passage rate, for 
example, dropped by a whopping 22 percentage points (from 94% to 72%) during this 
period, while New York’s passage rate declined from 73% to 61%. By contrast, states like 
Mississippi and North Dakota, both of which plausibly would like to raise the number of 
lawyers practicing within their borders, actually increased their passage rates (in Mississippi 
from 69% to 81% and in North Dakota from 78% to 85%) during this period. The statistics 
in this paragraph are from Nat’l Conference of Bar Examiners, 1994 Statistics, B. EXAMINER, 
May 1995, at 8, 9-10, available at http://www.ncbex.org/stats/pdf/1994stats.pdf; Nat’l 
Conference of Bar Examiners, 2002 Statistics, B. EXAMINER, May 2003, at 6, 6-7, available 
at http://www.ncbex.org/stats/pdf/2002stats.pdf. 
122. See Andrew M. Perlman, A Bar Against Competition: The Unconstitutionality of 
Admission Rules for Out-of-State Lawyers, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 135, 142-43 (2004) 
(noting that many states require attorneys seeking to relocate to retake the entire bar exam 
and that many of those who do not require special attorneys’ exams); see also Birbrower, 
Montalbano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998) (holding that 
lawyers who were fully licensed in New York were guilty of the unauthorized practice of 
law in California for representing a California client in connection with a pending 
arbitration). 
123. See, e.g., Kidder, supra note 119, at 549-55; Perlman, supra note 122, at 146-50. 
As Kidder makes clear, even if one accounts for the fact that some of the change in passage 
rates is a result of the changes in the applicant pool, the protectionist motivations of many 
bar officials are nevertheless apparent in light of the many misleading statements by such WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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they nevertheless cast serious doubt on any attempt to equate bar passage with 
legal competence.124 
This conclusion is particularly compelling in light of the fact that the bar 
exam has never been validated as a good predictor of whether a candidate will 
become a competent or ethical practitioner.125 Sander spends a great deal of 
time demonstrating that there is a positive correlation among entering 
credentials—most notably the LSAT—law school grades, and bar passage.126 
Accepting arguendo that all of these connections are as strong as Sander 
suggests,127 it says nothing about whether the bar exam is correlated in any 
significant way with competence or success in practice. Yet, Sander routinely 
assumes that these correlations are not only self-evidently true but are highly 
officials concerning the need to make the exam tougher because of the declining quality of 
applicants. Kidder, supra note 119, at 551-55. 
124. Following Birbrower the California Legislature passed a statute allowing out-of-
state lawyers to represent clients in arbitration proceedings (the type of proceeding at issue in 
Birbrower) so long as there is also a local lawyer acting as “counsel of record.” More 
recently, the ABA Committee on Multijurisdictional Practice has proposed rules that would 
also take some of the sting out of the Birbrower restrictions. Perlman, supra note 122, at 140 
n.20. As Rick Abel’s trenchant work has repeatedly taught us, however, the fact that lawyers 
are not always successful at restricting competition does not mean that they do not continue 
to try. See ABEL, supra note 16. 
125.S e e  D EBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 151 (2000) (“No effort has been made to correlate performance on admission 
exams with performance in practice. The most that bar officials can establish is a correlation 
between examination scores and law school grades.”). 
126. Sander, supra note 2, at 418-25. 
127. It is not surprising that LSAT scores are highly correlated with bar passage. Both 
exams share many of the same properties, i.e., both use multiple choice and/or short essay 
formats and are administered under extreme time constraints. As a result, it is not surprising 
that those who do well on one are likely to do well on the other—and that issues of 
stereotype threat are likely to be activated in both situations. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua 
Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Academically Successful African 
Americans, in THE BLACK-WHITE TEST SCORE GAP 401 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith 
Phillips eds., 1998). As Sander concedes, law school exams also share some of these 
qualities. I am inclined to agree with Sander that there are also important differences 
between standardized tests and exams. Having said that, however, it is important to note that 
the evidence Sander proffers for the proposition that all of these devices are not simply 
measuring the same limited set of qualities under essentially similar conditions is quite weak. 
Sander points to evidence from two data sources that the black-white gap in legal writing 
courses is equal to, if not larger than, the gap for courses employing traditional exams. 
Sander, supra note 2, at 424 n.164. As he concedes, however, the sample size for both data 
sources is tiny and the samples are arguably quite skewed. Moreover, as he also notes but 
then dismisses, legal writing classes are not graded anonymously. Although I tend to agree 
with Sander that professors—or, more likely, the recent graduates or adjuncts who actually 
grade student papers in these courses—are not likely to be consciously biased against blacks, 
as my interviews have revealed time and time again, the stereotype that “blacks can’t write” 
is so pervasive in our culture that it is quite possible that it often penetrates at a subconscious 
level the highly discretionary subjective judgments that those grading these exercises 
invariably employ. At a minimum, Sander’s concession that “more research on this point is 
needed” is a dramatic understatement. Id. at 434 n.182. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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probative and operate in a continuous and linear manner—i.e., that the higher 
one’s score on the bar exam, the better lawyer one is likely to become. 
There is not a shred of evidence that this is true. Even if we concede that 
the substantive knowledge, writing skills, and analytic ability that bar exams 
seek to measure are relevant to legal competence, a moment’s reflection makes 
it clear that the bar is less likely to measure these qualities accurately—let 
alone the full range of competencies that go into making a good lawyer—than 
even the typical law school exam, which, as we have seen, does so only 
imperfectly. One way to see this is to notice that the best law schools in the 
country almost never test their students by means of the kind of multiple choice 
questions that form the core of every bar exam. Indeed, as Sander concedes, 
most top law schools don’t even teach the black letter rules that dominate the 
bar. Many schools no longer even offer the subjects—agency and trusts and 
estates, for example—that are routinely covered on many state bars. Clearly, in 
the opinion of those schools who consider themselves to be the leaders in 
training top lawyers, neither the methodology nor the content of the average bar 
exam is essential to the task of producing competent practitioners. 
Moreover, even if one is inclined to believe that being able to pass the bar 
is an important signal about competence, the margin by which one passes the 
exam is almost certainly irrelevant to any judgment about future performance. 
Sander argues that even if he is wrong that the total number of black lawyers 
will increase if we eliminate affirmative action, his plan should still be adopted 
because it will “change dramatically . . . the academic preparation of those 
blacks who become attorneys.”128 As proof, he cites the fact that one-fifth of 
black practicing lawyers have failed the bar at least once and notes that it is “a 
statistical certainty that many blacks who pass the bar pass by very small 
margins.”129 “If we believe that bar exams measure anything relevant to good 
lawyering,” he concludes, sharply raising the first-time passage rate and the 
scores of those who pass the exam “would be a very good thing.”130 
At no point, however, does Sander tell us why in the world this remarkable 
statement is likely to be true—especially with respect to those black students 
who are currently passing the exam on their first attempt. To be sure, there are 
often significant costs associated with failing the bar for the first time.131 
Helping prospective black lawyers to avoid these costs would indeed be a very 
128. Id. at 477. 
129. Id.   
130. Id. at 478.  
131. In addition to the cost of retaking the exam, and the undeniable psychological 
trauma associated with failing such a high-stakes test, employers may also take adverse 
action against those who fail the bar. We know very little, however, about how important 
such sanctions are for graduates of low-status schools, many of whom may be working as 
solo practitioners or in other settings where failing the bar is either more common or the 
consequences of failing less severe than we tend to think of them as being for the graduates 
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good thing, although as I will suggest, there are better ways of achieving this 
goal than the draconian one Sander suggests.132 Nevertheless, it is important to 
emphasize that even these costs are likely to be temporary and to be dwarfed by 
the benefit of eventually becoming a lawyer. More importantly, whatever costs 
there are to failing the exam the first time, there are no costs to passing the 
exam by a narrow margin. Indeed, one might argue that the opposite is true: 
those who pass by large margins have invested way too much time in studying 
for the exam!133 It is simply not true that if we think the bar measures 
“anything at all” that we also have to believe that incremental increases in 
passing scores tell us anything important about competence or future success. 
Even if one concedes, as Sander argues in an earlier footnote, that a one-point 
difference in index scores is relevant to predicting law school grades,134 the 
dependent variable allegedly measured by bar passage—fitness to practice 
law—is so much more complex to identify and predict than the grades the 
LSAT claims to forecast that it is simply implausible that anything like this 
same kind of linear relationship exists with respect to bar exam scores, no 
matter how great a sample size one can amass. The implausibility of any such 
linear correlation is, of course, precisely why no bar authority has ever asserted 
that the exam they administer is capable of this kind of precision. 
Indeed, the only reason to be concerned about the margin by which black 
candidates pass the bar is that bar officials have strong incentives to steadily 
increase the threshold for a passing score in order to decrease the number of 
new lawyers coming into the marketplace. As I have indicated above, this is 
just what they appear to be doing. Sander hypothesizes that bar officials might 
be inclined to raise the threshold even higher if they were not so worried that 
this would push black failure rates to unacceptable levels.135 Although some 
have objected to raising passing thresholds on this ground, the real reason to 
oppose such increases lies elsewhere.136 Given the dramatic increase in the 
overall quality of the pool of test-takers—including, as Sander documents, 
blacks at the bottom of the distribution—if bar officials were to take such 
action it would provide additional evidence that their real interest is 
competition, not quality. 
Once we free ourselves of the assumption that those who fail to pass the 
bar—let alone those who have difficulty passing the bar—are for this reason 
132. Similarly, it would unquestionably be a good thing to help more black students 
graduate from law school. The question, however, is whether there are other ways to achieve 
this goal that do not require the substantial costs associated with dismantling affirmative 
action outlined above. 
133. As I often tell my students, you do not want to get an “A” on the bar exam. 
134. Sander, supra note 2, at 423 n.159. Needless to say, even this is a highly debatable 
proposition. 
135. Id. at 481. 
136.S e e  Kidder, supra note 119, at 569-75 (noting opposition to raising thresholds on 
the ground that it would disproportionately hurt black applicants).. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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alone presumptively incompetent to practice law, we can imagine a number of  
ways to address the depressing statistics Sander cites with respect to the odds 
that blacks in the bottom part of the distribution face in becoming lawyers. For 
starters, states could simply refrain from escalating passing scores, or better yet, 
return them to their 1994 levels. Given that passing rates nationally have 
declined from 82.3% to 74.7% during this period,137 it is quite possible that this 
change alone would substantially increase the production of black lawyers.138 
Second, we could encourage those black law students who fail the exam on 
their first attempt to retake it. According to Wightman, a significant number of 
blacks who fail the bar on the first attempt never take the exam again.139 Some 
of these disappointed test-takers would undoubtedly pass the exam if they took 
it a second or third time.140 Given that there is no reason to believe that those 
who fail to pass on the first attempt are by that reason alone incompetent to 
practice law, we should make every effort to encourage them to do so. 
One way to accomplish this objective—and to raise passage rates 
generally—would be to guarantee that every black student in this part of the 
distribution is able to take a bar review course. Sander discounts the importance 
of test preparation courses, but the only evidence he cites for this proposition 
relates to the SAT.141 Unlike the SAT, however, the bar does not pretend to be 
an “aptitude” test for which coaching is presumptively unnecessary or 
ineffective.142 To the contrary, the bar is much more like an “achievement” test 
that purports to examine learned knowledge and skill. Only in this case, the 
137. See Sander, supra note 2, at 475.  
138. As Sander acknowledges, rising passing scores disproportionately burden black 
test-takers. Sander, supra note 2, at 475-76. It is impossible to say how much rolling back 
passing rates would improve black bar passage without knowing much more about the 
demographics and passage rates in particular states. Nevertheless, even if the 8.6% increase 
in the overall passage rate that would result from returning to 1994 levels produced only a 
3% or 4% rise in black passage rates, this would translate into almost half of the number of 
additional black lawyers that Sander posits would result from eliminating affirmative action. 
Cf. id. at 476 (noting that the black first-time passage rate in California fell by almost 15% 
when the state raised its minimum passing score). 
139. “[B]lack examinees [who] failed the first attempt at the bar and never attempted it 
again . . . represent nearly half of those in the failed category” of bar passage rates. 
Wightman, supra note 111, at 55. 
140. Even if passage rates generally decline with repeated attempts, so long as they do 
not decline to zero or we have some other reason for thinking that those who do not retake 
the test are especially inclined to fail, we can safely predict that some blacks who currently 
stop after the first failure would eventually become lawyers. Cf. id. at 54-55 (“Among the 
passing black examinees, 222 required more than one attempt. Among those, 69 percent 
passed on their second attempt and 93 percent passed by the third attempt.”). 
141. Sander, supra note 2, at 423 & n.160. 
142. Whether this is in fact true of the SAT—or even more importantly for our 
purposes, the LSAT—I leave for others to debate. For an early study suggesting that the 
LSAT is indeed coachable, see Brian Powell & Lala Carr Steelman, Equity and the LSAT, 53 
HARV. EDUC. REV. 32, 40-41 (1983) (finding gains as high as 33-40 points on a 200-600 
point scale from only two hours of coaching). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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knowledge that test-takers are supposed to have is often not taught in law 
school.143 So where do students learn all of this? In bar review class, of course, 
along with a wealth of test-taking techniques, information about past exams, 
tips about commonly asked questions, and, perhaps most important of all, the 
opportunity to practice, practice, practice. As someone who owes his own bar 
card to BarBri, it is simply inconceivable to me that these courses do not 
improve one’s chances of passing the exam. 
We do not have good evidence about the relative access of blacks and 
whites to bar review courses. But even if we assume, as one study of New York 
lawyers suggests, that “the vast majority of law graduates” take bar preparation 
courses, there are still good reasons to believe that the black lawyers we are 
currently discussing are more likely to be in the minority of students who do 
not have access to this crucial resource.144 Bar review courses are expensive, 
and unlike students at elite schools, the blacks in this part of the distribution 
will rarely have this expense paid for by their future employers.145 If we add 
the plausible assumption that on average blacks who attend low-status law 
schools have few resources to pay for such courses on their own—particularly 
more than once—then it is very likely that we could improve passage rates 
among this group by ensuring that more of them have the opportunity to take 
advantage of this crucial resource.146 
143. This is especially true, as I have suggested, in elite schools, but it is generally true 
across the board. Even schools that “teach to the bar” are likely to fail to cover many areas 
that actually appear on the exam, and few students will have taken all of the bar-related 
courses that are offered. Moreover, even local and regional schools typically teach federal 
(or generically national) rules with little emphasis on the peculiar variations and practices in 
their own jurisdiction, let alone differences that might exist elsewhere. Yet these differences 
are the standard grist for the mill of the typical state bar exam. 
144. See Comm. on Legal Educ. & Admission to the Bar, Ass’n of the Bar of the City 
of N.Y., Report on Admission to the Bar in New York in the Twenty First Century—A 
Blueprint for Reform, 47 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 464, 484, 503-04 (1992). 
145. It is important to emphasize that the costs of a bar preparation course must be 
added to the substantial cost of studying for the exam, which can take literally hundreds of 
hours. See Kristen Booth Glen, When and Where We Enter: Rethinking Admission to the 
Legal Profession, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1696, 1734 (2002) (suggesting that 350 hours of study 
is traditionally the time needed to study for the bar). For elite law school graduates, this time 
is typically subsidized (if not paid for outright) by their future employers. Once again, this 
subsidy will not be available to most of the graduates from the low-status law schools we are 
discussing who must find ways to support themselves and pay the fees associated with the 
exam itself before they can even think about paying for a bar review course. 
146. See Andrea A. Curcio, A Better Bar: Why and How the Existing Bar Exam Should 
Change, 81 NEB. L. REV. 363, 391 (2002) (citing evidence from the Bar Passage Study that 
blacks are more likely to have financial or family responsibilities that plausibly affect access 
to bar review courses and bar passage rates); see also C OMM. ON BAR ADMISSIONS AND 
LAWYER  PERFORMANCE  &  RICHARD  A.  WHITE,  AALS  SURVEY OF LAW  SCHOOLS ON 
PROGRAMS AND COURSES  DESIGNED TO ENHANCE  BAR  EXAMINATION  PERFORMANCE 21 
(2001), available at http://www.aals.org/Bar2001Report.pdf (noting that CUNY reported an 
increase in its MBE scores upon providing its students with the PMBR course free of 
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Needless to say, if we were prepared to think about modifying the bar 
exam, or even more radically, of eliminating it altogether (either for certain 
forms of legal practice or in toto), we would likely boost the number of black 
lawyers (or their equivalent) even further.147 How much, of course, would 
depend upon the specific modifications taken and an assessment of how these 
changes might track performance that may be correlated with race.148 It is 
possible, for example, that blacks would do better on an exam that included an 
element of oral advocacy or that called for team building skill or gave credit for 
public service.149 Similarly, it is quite possible that many of the tasks lawyers 
in this part of the distribution typically undertake—real estate closings, simple 
wills, uncontested divorces—do not require three years of legal education 
followed by a two-day bar examination and character and fitness review to be 
performed competently and efficiently.150 
None of this means that we should ignore the issues related to black 
performance in law school and on the bar exam that Sander documents. Paying 
attention to these issues, however, does not require that we throw out 524 
affirmative action babies (to borrow Steve Carter’s admittedly infantalizing 
term151), and risk damaging the career prospects of hundreds more who 
currently attend top schools, in order to clean up the dirty bathwater that has 
unfortunately too often resulted from the way that race continues to structure 
and cloud our thinking about how to help our profession and our nation move 
beyond its racist past. I conclude with a few thoughts about how to clarify our 
thinking without crucifying the very black lawyers who continue to bear the 
brunt of our collective struggle to move beyond the problem of the color line in 
this new century. 
147. For an excellent review of possible alternatives to the current bar exam, see 
Kidder, supra note 119, at 563-82. 
148. Whether any particular set of skills or abilities is caused by race is, of course, a 
different and much more controversial question. Like Sander, I am skeptical of any claim 
that suggests that there are innate differences between blacks and whites and therefore doubt 
that any causal connection between race and performance exists. That said, it is certainly 
plausible that given a variety of psychological, cultural, and measurement-related issues, 
blacks are more likely to score better on some kinds of exams than others. See Steele & 
Aronson, supra note 127. 
149. For one such proposal by the dean of CUNY Queens Law School, see Kristin 
Booth Glen, Thinking Outside the Bar Exam Box: A Proposal to “MacCrate” Entry to the 
Profession, 23 PACE L. REV. 343 (2003). 
150. Indeed, many of these low-level individual services are currently performed by 
paralegals who have no formal legal training but who must now work under the nominal 
supervision of attorneys (who, of course, continue to extract the majority of the gains). 
151.S e e  STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY (1991). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
Month 20xx]  DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION 141 
 
IV. SOME STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT STRAIGHT TALK 
Rick Sander has performed a valuable—if painful—service in highlighting 
the fact that affirmative action entails potential risks as well as benefits for 
black lawyers. Even if one concedes that these risks are as great as Sander 
indicates, however, it is hard to see why disclosure is not the sole appropriate 
remedy. As an economist, Sander belongs to a profession that typically thinks 
that people ought to be able to make their own decisions about how to weigh 
the risks and benefits that they confront in their lives. To the extent that going 
to a more highly ranked law school, or in the case of the students at the bottom 
of the distribution, going to law school at all, will often produce costs (in terms 
of the risk of attrition, low grades, and difficulty on the bar) that outweigh the 
potential benefits of graduating from such an institution and becoming a 
lawyer, then it would seem that the solution would be to convey this 
information to black applicants in a form that would allow them to decide for 
themselves whether to take the risk. 
This is indeed Sander’s first line of attack. When one examines the kind of 
disclosure he proposes, however, it is evident that something more is at stake 
than simply helping black applicants make better choices about whether and 
where to seek a legal education. Worse yet, the manner in which Sander 
suggests making this disclosure seems destined to reinforce, rather than to 
correct, the discouragement and disengagement that Sander argues plays a 
crucial role in producing the disquieting statistics he cites. 
Sander proposes that every law school should provide every applicant with 
the median index scores, class rank, and bar passage scores—broken down by 
race—for every applicant, student, and/or graduate.152 Some of this data would 
indeed be useful for black applicants considering their chances of graduating 
and becoming a lawyer if they choose to attend a particular school. But other 
information would be equally, if not more, valuable. For example, where are 
graduates of this school likely to be five, ten, or fifteen years out of law school? 
How does this compare to where graduates of more or less highly ranked 
schools tend to end up? What kinds of academic support programs does a 
school have and how effective have such programs been in helping students 
with comparably low index scores improve their academic performance or pass 
the bar? Have there been any racial incidents at the school in the last few years 
and what, if anything, has the school done to assess or improve its racial 
climate? The point simply is that all students—especially those attending less 
highly ranked schools—would benefit from more information about their 
prospects for success in school and after graduation. Admissions data, GPAs, 
and bar passage rates are only a few of the numerous factors that a student 
would want to consider in order to make a fully informed choice. 
152. Sander, supra note 2, at 482. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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Although more disclosure would undoubtedly be beneficial, it is not at all 
clear how distributing racial breakdowns of admission statistics, grades, and bar 
passage rates to all students will benefit black applicants or admittees, 
especially those who decide to brave the odds and attend a more highly ranked 
school than Sander’s thesis would suggest that they should.153 Rather than 
helping these students make a rational choice about risks and benefits, the 
disclosure Sander suggests seems likely to reinforce the idea, already far too 
prevalent among white students and faculty, that the black students who do 
enroll are not competent to do the work or to become lawyers. Whatever value 
Sander might argue that there is to demonstrating that Justice O’Connor was 
wrong in Grutter, or to providing white students with a road map about how 
affirmative action is working at a given institution, one would be hard-pressed 
to come up with a reason why any of this will benefit the black students and 
lawyers whose interests, once again, Sander asserts he is protecting. 
Worse still, by focusing only on the most negative aspects of the current 
reality—i.e., that many black students receive low grades and have difficulty 
passing the bar—without giving at least equal time to the positive news that 
most black lawyers are leading successful and productive careers, Sander’s 
proposed disclosure is destined to exacerbate the extent to which black law 
students currently feel alienated and disengaged. Sander argues that black 
students who find themselves in academic environments for which they are 
unprepared will often become “stressed out” or “disengaged” in ways that 
further lower their performance.154 My interviews with black lawyers suggest 
that there is some truth to this theory. Several of those in my sample look back 
with regret on their time in law school and wish that they had taken more 
advantage of the opportunities that were provided. Many of those who 
expressed these feelings confessed that they found law school “overwhelming” 
and “intimidating” and that it was difficult to go from being the “golden child” 
who was always at the top of his or her class to someone who struggled 
academically. 
Although this phenomenon is therefore real and important, there are three 
factors that Sander leaves out of his presentation that are critical to 
understanding this reality and what we might do to prevent it. First, it should be 
obvious to anyone who has ever taught in a law school, especially one that is 
highly ranked, that black students are far from the only ones who disengage 
from their studies after finding that law school is more difficult than they 
153. As David Chambers has suggested to me in comments on a prior draft, why not 
simply give every admitted student their own index score and the chances of graduating for 
students in various index ranges? This would allow all students who are being admitted with 
low scores to understand the risk that they might not graduate (or, in the case of those 
attending elite schools, to be reassured about the fact that they are quite likely to graduate) 
without also reinforcing stereotypes and motivational problems of the kind described in the 
text. 
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expected it to be. At schools such as my own, for example, it is sadly true that 
after first-semester grades come out, a large percentage of students do exactly 
what Sander suggests black students do: “blame the system—the professor, the 
school, or legal education generally—and . . . reduce [their] effort.”155 Indeed, 
as Sander and his coauthor Mitu Gulati discovered in their study of third-year 
law students, by the time many students get to this stage of their career, a very 
substantial percentage are no longer attending class at all.156 As the authors 
conclude, this reality raises serious questions about what, if anything, we are 
accomplishing in the third year of law school—questions, it should go without 
saying, that raise issues extending far beyond the future of affirmative action. 
Second, the difficulties that black students experience in law school 
sometimes have more to do with their failure to understand the rules of the 
game than the inherent difficulty of the material. Sander is correct that many 
black students spend just as much time studying as their white peers yet often 
have less to show for it.157 He assumes that this means that these students are 
academically unprepared for the challenge. But there is another plausible 
explanation—that they do not know how to study the right way in order to 
maximize their chances of doing well. My interviews are filled with black 
lawyers who lament the fact that they had no idea how to study efficiently 
during their first year in law school. Some of those who fall in this category 
eventually did catch on and substantially improved their performance in their 
second and third years. As Sander predicts, however, others unfortunately 
became discouraged, believing that they were not going to do well in school no 
matter how hard they tried. What Sander leaves out of his account, however, is 
that in many instances, this resignation was facilitated by the low expectations 
of faculty and fellow students. 
Sander’s account of discouragement and disengagement is entirely internal. 
Black students in his view realize that they are overmatched and become 
frustrated and withdrawn, thereby diminishing their chances of succeeding even 
further. Strangely absent from this account is any acknowledgement of how the 
expectations of others contribute to this deadly cycle. Any plausible theory of 
motivation, however, must begin with an understanding that such feelings are 
profoundly interactive. People are more likely to do well when they are 
expected to do well.158 More to the point, they are much less likely to succeed 
155. Id. at 450-51; see also Note, Making Docile Lawyers: An Essay on the 
Pacification of Law Students, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2027 (1998) (arguing that Harvard law 
students who do not get high grades routinely disengage from their studies). 
156. Mitu Gulati et al., The Happy Charade: An Empirical Examination of the Third 
Year of Law School, 51 J. LEGAL EDUC. 235, 244 (2001). 
157. Sander, supra note 2, at 453. 
158. Recall Judge Edwards’s statement that “I had the . . . assumption that I was smart, 
and I believed it.” Edwards, supra note 98, at 39 (second emphasis added). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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when they are expected to fail.159 Unfortunately, this is precisely the message 
that has often been conveyed to entering black students. Sometimes the 
message has been express. As a respondent who entered a top ten law school in 
the early 1980s reports, “[T]he first week of law school, . . . the dean of our law 
school came to a Black Law Students Association (BLSA) meeting and said, 
‘You guys won’t do as well as the other people here.’ I mean, he just said 
it!”160 Other times the message is the unintended but nevertheless powerful 
consequence of diverting all black students into academic support programs.161 
Still others have felt the sting of low expectations when professors fail to call 
on black students in class.162 For another group, it has been the presumptions 
expressed by fellow students.163 
There is no doubt that the very existence of affirmative action complicates all 
of these effects. As Sander might argue, it is precisely because of the existence of 
such programs that schools, professors, and students doubt the competence of 
159. Geoffrey Cohen suggests that black students may be especially sensitive to 
negative expectations. See  Geoffrey L. Cohen et al., The Mentor’s Dilemma: Providing 
Critical Feedback Across the Racial Divide, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1302 
(1999). 
160. Interview 55, at 14 (July 11, 1997). 
161. A respondent who went to Emory Law School in the mid-1980s underscores how 
such well-intentioned efforts can quickly turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy: 
The most frustrating aspect of Emory was that . . . you’d go to these special programs for 
minority students, and they’d basically tell you walking in the door that black students at 
Emory don’t do well. And it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy . . . . You go through your 
first semester. You really don’t know what you’re doing. You haven’t really been able to 
make contact with some of the other students to get the understanding of how you need to be 
studying and how your outlines need to be, and you don’t know to go and talk to your 
professors and things of that nature. All you hear is black students at Emory don’t do well. 
So, first semester grades come in, many of the students didn’t do extremely well, and so 
therefore it became, well, why should I even try because no matter how hard I try, I’m not 
going to do well. 
Interview 140, at 6 (Aug. 9, 1999); cf. Clydesdale, supra note 11 (finding that participation 
in a pre-law school academic support program is negatively correlated with bar passage). 
162. As one typical respondent reports: 
In civil procedure . . . , the professor asked a very difficult question. It was my second week 
of class. I had no idea what he was talking about. I didn’t realize no one else did either at the 
time, but I never will forget. He went down the row, he called on eight people, and he got to 
me and he skipped over me and went on to the next person. I guess he said, “Well, I know he 
doesn’t know.” 
Interview 125, at 5 (Aug. 11, 1999). As the respondent went on to make clear: 
It made me feel even more inferior, that he had assumed that because I am black—that was 
the only reason I could think of why he would skip over me, that I didn’t know—I wouldn’t 
have a reasonable response to the question. 
Id. 
163. As one respondent who went to law school in the year Bakke  was under 
consideration described how he was treated by other students: “[I]t just seemed like we were 
under an insidious, constant attack. And you put that on top of just the general first year 
experience, adjusting to the first year of law school, didn’t make for a very, very pleasant 
experience.” Interview 29, at 31 (June 27, 1997). As Clydesdale notes, black students are 
significantly more likely than others to report having experienced racist incidents while in 
school. See Clydesdale, supra note 11, at 757. WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
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incoming black students. As I have argued, research on unconscious bias suggests 
that the roots of these feelings extend far deeper than any particular policy or 
practice. For present purposes, however, the key point is that whatever one thinks 
about these psychological dynamics, Sander’s disclosure proposals seem destined 
to make them worse. 
Indeed, given the very “cascade effects” Sander identifies, it is hard to 
imagine that the implicit message of Sander’s analysis—that the black 
beneficiaries of affirmative action are not qualified to become competent and 
successful practitioners—will not spread in a manner that is destined to undermine 
the very goal of improving the condition of the black bar that his express argument 
is designed to promote. Sander’s assertion that eliminating affirmative action in 
law school will increase the production of black lawyers and improve (or at a 
minimum, not retard) the progress of blacks in the job market depends upon 
everything else staying the same. Yet given his observation that law schools are 
part of a connected system in which the actions of particular actors have 
predictable consequences on the outlook and choices of other participants, this 
assumption is highly dubious. At the entry level, for example, will elite colleges—
or elite high schools for that matter—continue aggressively to recruit black 
students in a world in which law schools declare that such efforts actually harm 
their intended beneficiaries? Similarly, at the exit level, will law firms and other 
employers continue their fledgling affirmative efforts to recruit and retain black 
lawyers if the very institutions that produce these students announce that such 
policies harm blacks by placing them in situations where they will be 
“overmatched”? Needless to say, if affirmative action were reduced significantly 
at the entry level, then Sander’s already optimistic projections about the number of 
blacks who would be admitted to law school under his proposal become even less 
plausible.164 The situation would likely be even worse if legal employers follow 
Sander’s lead and decrease their own affirmative efforts to recruit and retain black 
lawyers.165 Given that there are already several efforts underway to reverse 
164. Virtually every law school “norms” the grades of all of its applicants to account 
for perceived differences in quality among undergraduate institutions. Clearly, if black 
applicants were to come increasingly from less prestigious colleges and universities, this 
would negatively affect their chances of getting into a good law school. 
165. Notwithstanding all of the talk about the fact that “diversity is good for business,” 
it is plain that many law firm partners and other similar employers believe that they are 
engaging in “affirmative action” when they hire black lawyers with credentials—or from 
institutions—that, if presented by a white candidate, would be unlikely to lead to a decision 
to hire. See Wilkins, Book Review, supra note 35, at 1955-57 (discussing how many partners 
believe in the “affirmative action myth” that all black lawyers—even those who meet all of a 
firm’s traditional qualifications—are in fact the product of affirmative action). Indeed, even 
apart from their views about affirmative action, the logic of Sander’s proposal is likely to 
lead many employers to rely more on law school status as a proxy for potential than they do 
today. After all, under Sander’s plan the “overmatched” black students who are not admitted 
to top schools will be replaced by white students who are, according to their entering 
credentials, not overmatched. Although some of these  white students (or others of their 
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Grutter either through litigation or legislation, a realistic appraisal of the costs of 
implementing Sander’s proposal must account for these plausible systemwide 
effects.166 
Now, let me be very clear here. I am not arguing that we should hide from the 
troubling statistics about black performance that Sander outlines or that our entire 
system depends, as Sander seems to suggest, upon our collective willingness to 
blind ourselves to the realities of how affirmative action actually works. To the 
contrary, I am making a plea that any discussion about black performance must 
take place within a broader examination of how affirmative action—and the 
market for legal services generally—actually works.167 This reality, as I have tried 
to suggest, is far more complex than the simplified universe of inputs and outputs 
that Sander’s analysis seems to assume. The LSAT, law school grades, and the bar 
exam undoubtedly measure some qualities that are relevant to whether one is 
likely to become a good lawyer. To the extent that black students are performing 
poorly on these measures, it is a legitimate and important cause for concern. But 
any plan for addressing these problems must also acknowledge that the causes of 
these achievement gaps are multiple and complex and that their implications for 
legal competence are largely unknown. 
What we do know is this. Affirmative action in law school admissions has 
played a crucial role in transforming a once exclusionary and insular profession 
into one that is at least tolerably diverse. Notwithstanding the difficulties Sander 
grades the black students used to get (since most schools grade on a curve), their “quality” 
(as measured by their index scores) will actually be higher. Therefore, a rational employer 
persuaded by Sander’s argument about the correlation among index scores, grades, and merit 
may very well put more stock in law school status under Sander’s plan than they do today. 
This process is likely to damage the employment prospects of black students without elite 
credentials even further. I am grateful to my research assistant Thomas Tso for pressing this 
point. Finally, black law students might decrease their effort to do well in law school if they 
see the prospect of getting a good job after graduation as becoming too remote. See Wilkins 
& Gulati, supra note 35, at 602-03 (arguing that affirmative action in recruiting actually 
raises the incentives for black lawyers by helping them to believe that they have a realistic 
chance to succeed). Given these combined effects, it is not surprising that Holzer and 
Neumark conclude that “in our view discrimination [in the labor market] persists even in the 
face of affirmative action, and would likely worsen in its absence . . . .” Holzer & Neumark, 
supra note 33, at 501. 
166.S e e  Court Revives Diversity Issue in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2004, at A11 
(reporting that a court has cleared the way for a Michigan ballot initiative outlawing 
affirmative action); Daniel Golden, Not Black and White: Colleges Cut Back Minority 
Programs After Court Rulings, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2003, at A1 (reporting on various court 
challenges to minority scholarships and other similar programs after Grutter). 
167. More needs to be known about the process of legal education as well. As Tim 
Clydesdale notes, entering credentials do not fully explain black performance in law school. 
Clydesdale,  supra  note 11, at 711. Something in the law school environment is further 
depressing black achievement. Whether that something is discrimination, stereotype threat, 
culture, or expectations, any meaningful attempt to improve black performance must account 
for this reality. See also L ANI  GUINIER ET AL.,  BECOMING  GENTLEMEN:  WOMEN,  LAW 
SCHOOL, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 76-77 (1997) (making a similar argument about the 
performance of female students). WILKINS CHANGES ACCEPTED 5/4/2005 8:51:40 AM 
Month 20xx]  DRAFT: NOT FOR CITATION 147 
 
documents, the black lawyers who have been at the forefront of this 
transformation have for the most part done remarkably well—even if, like 
Anthony Chase, they sometimes struggle along the way. Any claim that most, or 
even a significant percentage, of these integration warriors would have been better 
off under a regime where law schools treated Bakke  as an indication that 
affirmative efforts were no longer necessary or desirable is simply not supported 
by the evidence. Unfortunately, “the battle for racial inclusion” has not, as Sander 
asserts, “been fought and largely won.”168 Race continues to structure the 
opportunities and outlook of all Americans even as overt discrimination based on 
race recedes. Any dialogue about affirmative action, or about legal education and 
practice generally, must candidly acknowledge this complex reality. When we do, 
we are likely to be able to see problems and imagine solutions that help us to 
improve opportunities for all Americans. 
 
168. Sander, supra note 2, at 483. 